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INTRODUCTION
In 2015 Pfizer, Inc., agreed to merge with Allergan—an Irish
corporation—in a transaction that would have resulted in a corporate group
with an Irish parent. This type of transaction, a so-called inversion, has been
the subject of much media attention. Depending on one’s political and
economic preferences, these transactions are either evidence of tax dodging
 J.D., C.P.A., Professor of Law, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA.
** Andy Zubco, Treasury of Spiritual Wisdom: A Collection of 10,0000 Inspirational
Quotations, 170 (3d ed. 1998) (quoting Publilius Syrus).
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by unpatriotic corporations, or a rational response to an unduly burdensome
U.S. corporate tax system. The Treasury Department issued regulations that
eliminated the planned tax benefits of the Pfizer deal and similarly-situated
inversions. The regulations are controversial and, allegedly exceed the
Treasury’s authority. We may never know whether these regulations are a
proper exercise of agency authority. Pfizer did not challenge the regulations;
instead, the transaction suffered an ignominious denouement—it was
scuttled.
Pfizer had good reason to forgo a legal challenge. The Anti-Injunction
Act, a century-and-a-half-year-old statute, precludes pre-enforcement
challenges to tax rules. In virtually all cases, payment of the tax in dispute
and a subsequent suit for refund is an adequate remedy for taxpayers.
However, in unusual circumstances, a post-enforcement challenge is neither
practical nor realistic. The anti-inversion regulations create unusual
circumstances, leading Pfizer to walk away from its deal with Allergan
without a fight.
Part I of this Article provides a detailed analysis of the Anti-Injunction
Act and its scope, as refined by a number of court decisions. The statute
emphasizes the importance of the government’s revenue collection function
and the result of its application can be quite harsh. Taxpayer attempts to skirt
the statute, whether by assertions that the challenged exaction is not a tax or
by assertions that the purpose of the suit has nothing to do with revenue
collection, have been largely unsuccessful. The Supreme Court, in its
landmark case upholding the constitutionality of the individual health
insurance mandate imposed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, clarified the statute’s application in certain respects.
Part II of this Article examines the special treatment often afforded the
Treasury in its tax administration role. The Anti-Injunction Act is but one
example of tax exceptionalism. The Treasury enjoys advantages granted by
Congress, but it also has appropriated advantages for itself. Its casual
relationship with the Administrative Procedure Act is well known. For
decades, however, the notion that tax rules were somehow different from
other rules resulted in less judicial deference to certain Treasury regulations.
In what was, at the time, considered a major win for the Treasury, a 2011
Supreme Court decision rejected tax exceptionalism and held that Treasury
regulations are entitled to the same deference enjoyed by other agencies. The
cost of this victory has been the application of general administrative law
principles to tax regulations, a previously foreign concept to the tax world.
In certain cases, administrative failures can render tax regulations invalid on
their face. An open question is whether such a failure opens the door for a
pre-enforcement taxpayer challenge.
Part III of this Article discusses the Pfizer-Allergan transaction and

MELONE_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

WHO NEEDS CHEVRON?

11/30/2017 2:51 PM

929

the anti-inversion regulations that sounded its death knell. This part also
examines the judicially-created exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act and
asserts that the existing exceptions are of little utility because they are either
inapplicable or are of little practical utility to a taxpayer contemplating a
transaction of the magnitude of the Pfizer deal. This part concludes with the
argument that the courts should apply the existing exceptions to the statute
in a more nuanced and equitable manner. The effect of the anti-inversion
regulations on taxpayers is unusual and the courts should react accordingly.
There is something unseemly about a legal system which leaves a taxpayer
with no practical alternative to capitulating to tax rules that it believes are
unlawful. The importance of the revenue raising function is not in dispute,
but that importance should not blind the courts to basic principles of equity.
The ever-increasing use of the tax code as an instrument of social policy, as
opposed to government funding, should give impetus to the courts to be less
reflexive in their application of the statute.
I.

ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT

I.R.C. section 7421, the Anti-Injunction Act, prohibits any “suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax . . . in any court
by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such
tax was assessed.”1 Similarly prohibited are suits for the purposes of
restraining the assessment or collection of the liability of a transferee of
property of a taxpayer with respect to any internal revenue tax or the amount
of the liability of a fiduciary for unpaid taxes.2 The statute’s requirement
that taxpayers resolve their tax disputes in a suit for refund, a principle that
has been in effect in some statutory form since 1867, is an unremarkable
admonition to taxpayers that they must exhaust administrative remedies
before proceeding to court.3 The Anti-Injunction Act provides legislative
1. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
2. I.R.C. § 7421(b).
3. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 168, 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475 (1867). The 1867 legislation
amended an 1866 statute that precluded suits for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected before an appeal was duly made to the
commissioner. See Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 191-92 (1883) (discussing the changes
made by the 1867 amendment to the 1866 act). There is no recorded legislative history of the
1867 statute. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974); see also Erin Morrow
Hawley, The Equitable Anti-Injunction Act, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 81, 95-98 (2014) (noting
that the legislative history of the Anti-Injunction Act is not recorded, but there are some
indicators of congressional motive). In order to file a refund suit, a taxpayer must first file a
claim for refund with the I.R.S. I.R.C. § 7422(a). Full payment of the assessed tax is required
in order to bring a suit for refund. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960) (interpreting
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2012) to mean the district courts and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
have concurrent jurisdiction in any civil action against the United States for the recovery of
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notice of the “[g]overnment’s need to assess and collect taxes as
expeditiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial
interference.”4
Taxpayers do have a mechanism to challenge I.R.S. action prior to
enforcement—the United States Tax Court—but that mechanism is rather
limited and is, almost always, a pre-assessment mechanism.5 If the I.R.S.

any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, and finding that
the statutory language does not limit such suits to the person against whom the tax was
assessed). The Court has also held that a non-assessed party that had paid a tax to remove a
federal tax lien from her property had standing to bring a refund suit. United States v.
Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995).
4. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004) (quoting Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 736). Hibbs
involved another statute, the Tax Injunction Act, which precludes federal court interference
with the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law where an efficient remedy
is available through the state’s courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). The Court has interpreted
this statute similarly to the Anti-Injunction Act. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct.
1124, 1129 (2015) (suggesting the language of the Tax Injunction Act was modeled after the
Anti-Injunction Act and assuming the language used in both Acts are used the same way).
Whether an exaction is a tax for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act, an issue discussed in this
Article in the context of the Anti-Injunction Act, is beyond the scope of this work. At least
one court has defined the term “tax” very broadly for this purpose. See Henderson v. Stalder,
407 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Tramel v. Schrader, 505 F.2d 1310, 1315 (5th Cir.
1975) (defining a tax as an “extraction of property from a private person by a sovereign for
its use”)). In addition, the Declaratory Judgment Act precludes any declaratory judgments
“with respect to Federal taxes.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). Although the language of the
Declaratory Judgment Act is broader than the language of the Anti-Injunction Act, the statutes
have been interpreted to be coterminous. See Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 733 n. 7 (acknowledging
that a number of courts have held the two statutes as coterminous, but finding no occasion for
the Court to resolve in case at bar) (internal citations omitted); see also Cohen v. United States,
650 F.3d 717, 727-28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (highlighting precedent that interprets the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act as coterminous). An exception is provided in the
statute for declaratory judgments relating to the determinations of the tax-exempt status of
certain organizations. I.R.C. § 7428 (2012). This exception was added by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 and has mitigated the hardship that the preclusion of a pre-enforcement remedy
imposed upon tax exempt organizations. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
1306, 90 Stat. 1520, 1717 (1976). A discussion of cases involving the tax-exempt status of
organizations is available in footnotes 39-46 of this text.
5. The Tax Court has operated as a court of record under Article I of the Constitution
since 1969. See I.R.C. § 7441 (2012) (establishing the United States Tax Court as a
Constitutional court). Its predecessors, the Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court of the
United States, were both executive branch agencies. The former was created in 1924 and
operated until 1942 when it was re-designated as the Tax Court of the United States. See
Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336 (1924)
(establishing the Board of Tax Appeals); see also Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753,
ch. 619, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 798, 957 (1942) (establishing the Tax Court of the United States).
Congress believed that its placement within the executive branch raised questions about its
ability to act impartially as a judge of executive agency actions. Tax Reform Act of 1969, S.
Rep. No. 91-552, 302 (1969). At present, the court is comprised of nineteen judges, appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate to fifteen year terms, who can be removed from
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determines that there is a deficiency in the tax shown on income, estate, or
certain excise tax returns, or if no returns were filed, then it must send the
taxpayers a statutory notice of deficiency.6 The taxpayer may then petition
the Tax Court to review the deficiency claim within ninety days (150 days if
the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States) after the
statutory notice was mailed.7 The I.R.S. is precluded from assessing or
collecting the tax in question during the ninety day period (or 150 day period,
if applicable) and, if a petition to the Tax Court is filed, during the pendency
of the Tax Court’s proceedings.8
Section 7421 provides several exceptions to its general prohibition.
Collection activity may be enjoined in certain circumstances involving a
spouse seeking relief under the innocent spouse provisions of I.R.C. section
6015 and injunctions may be issued to prevent assessments and collections
during the pendency of Tax Court proceedings.9 In addition, as a result of
perceived abuses by the I.R.S. in its collection processes, Congress provided
taxpayers with the right to an administrative hearing upon the filing of a
notice of lien and prior to levy.10 Taxpayers may appeal the resultant
determination to the Tax Court. Collection activity must cease during the
pendency of the proceedings, and such activities may be enjoined by the Tax
Court or any other proper court.11

the bench only for cause. I.R.C. § 7443(b)-(f) (2012). Subject to certain exceptions, a
decision of the court is reviewable by the United States Court of Appeals and the court
considers itself bound by the rulings of the Court of Appeals to which the particular case
before it is appealable. I.R.C. § 7482 (2012); see also Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 757
(1970) (determining that judicial administration of the United States Tax Court is better when
decisions by the appropriate Court of Appeals are followed). The Supreme Court set forth
the framework for determining whether the scope of authority conferred upon a non-Article
III tribunal violates Article III, section 1 of the Constitution in Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), an analysis of which is beyond the scope of this work.
6. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (2012).
7. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
8. Id.
9. See id. (providing for enjoinment exceptions to the section 7421 prohibition).
10. I.R.C. §§ 6320(c), 6330(d)(1).
11. I.R.C. § 6330(e). Several other exceptions exist. The federal district court may,
among other exceptions, issue an injunction to prevent irreparable harm to the property rights
of others in the context of a levy or sale of property by the I.R.S. I.R.C. § 7426(b)(1).
Moreover, third parties are expressly provided standing to vindicate an interest in property
that has been wrongfully levied. I.R.C. § 7426(a). Exceptions to the statute are also provided
for collection activities undertaken during the pendency of a Tax Court proceeding
challenging federal liens and levies, with respect to certain partnership related matters, levy
and distraint proceedings, jeopardy assessments and levies, controversies regarding
employment status, and certain payroll tax matters. See I.R.C. § 7421(a).
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A. Tax or Penalty
A threshold question is whether the exaction subject to challenge is, in
fact, a tax subject to the statute. In National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, the controversial case that upheld the individual health
insurance mandate imposed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, the Court’s opinion placed significant emphasis on the label that
Congress chose to give to an exaction.12 The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act added section 5000A to the Internal Revenue Code,
requiring that individuals maintain a certain level of health insurance
coverage for themselves and dependents each month beginning after 2013.13
Failure to meet this requirement for one or more months results in the
imposition of a shared responsibility payment—which the statute terms a
penalty.14
Emphasizing that the Anti-Injunction Act applies to suits that seek to
restrain the assessment or collection of any tax, the Court stated that “[t]here
is no immediate reason to think that a statute applying to ‘any tax’ would
apply to a ‘penalty.’”15 It considered the fact that section 5000A labels the
exaction a penalty significant because many other exactions in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act are labeled taxes, and it is generally
12. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543-544 (2012).
13. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b),
10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 244-49, 909-10 (2010) (codified as I.R.C. § 5000A (2012)). The
penalty amount imposed by the statute was amended shortly thereafter by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §1002, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032-33
(2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 5000A (2012)). Certain exceptions are made for individuals who
qualify for statutorily defined religious conscience or health ministry exemptions, individuals
who are not citizens or nationals of the United States or legal aliens present in the United
States, incarcerated persons, members of Indian tribes, and low-income individuals. I.R.C.
§§ 5000A(d), 5000A(e)(1)-(3) (2012).
14. I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (2012). No penalty is imposed for gaps in coverage of less than
three months. I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(4). Payment of the penalty is made with a taxpayer’s income
tax return for the taxable year which includes the month that the failure to obtain minimum
essential coverage occurred. I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1)-(2). The amount of the penalty due for a
taxable year is the lesser of the sum of the monthly penalty amounts or the amount of the
national average insurance premiums for a particular level of coverage for the applicable
family size involved offered through insurance exchanges. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(1). The
national average premium is determined for plans that provide a “bronze” level of coverage,
a level of coverage that is designed to provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to sixty
percent of the full actuarial value of statutorily enumerated benefits. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§
18022(b), 18022(d) (2010). The monthly penalty amount is one-twelfth of the greater of a
flat dollar amount or a percentage of income. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2). The flat dollar amount
is $95 per individual failure in 2014, $325 per individual failure in 2015, and $695 per
individual failure thereafter. I.R.C. §§ 5000A(c)(3)(A)-(B). The latter figure is adjusted
annually for cost of living increases beginning in 2017. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(D).
15. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 543.
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presumed that the use of one term in one part of a statute and a different term
in another part of that statute is intentional.16 According to the Court,
Congress may determine for itself whether a particular statutory enactment
is subject to the Anti-Injunction Act and the best evidence of such a
determination is the text of the statute in question.17 Therefore, the AntiInjunction Act can apply to exactions that are not considered taxes for other
purposes.18 Moreover, the Anti-Injunction Act can apply to penalties if
Congress chooses to make it applicable to particular penalties.19
The Court noted that the Internal Revenue Code defines the term
“taxes” to include penalties that are codified at subchapter 68B of the Code.20
However, despite the fact that the statute states that the shared responsibility
payment shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as an assessable
penalty under subchapter 68B, the shared responsibility payment is not found
in subchapter 68B.21 The Court dismissed the argument that the language of
I.R.C. section 6201(a), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
assess all taxes and parenthetically defines taxes to include assessable
penalties, requires that the penalty be deemed a tax for purposes of the AntiInjunction Act.22 The Court unanimously held that, for purposes of the AntiInjunction Act, section 5000A imposes a penalty and not a tax.23
Accordingly, the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply to bar adjudication of the
issues on the merits.24 More recently, the D.C. Circuit, citing extensively to
Sebelius, held that the Anti-Injunction Act applied to bar a suit challenging
a penalty imposed upon banks that failed to report interest paid to certain
foreign account holders.25 The penalty at issue in the case was located in
16. Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); see e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1411
(imposing a 3.8 percent Medicare tax on unearned income beginning in 2013), 4191
(imposing a 2.3 percent tax on the sale of medical devices beginning in 2013), 4980I
(imposing a forty percent tax on employers providing high cost insurance coverage beginning
in 2018), 5000B (imposing a ten percent tax on tanning salon services to be paid by the
individual on whom the service is performed) (2012).
17. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 544.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. I.R.C. section 6671(a) states that any reference in the Internal Revenue Code to
taxes includes the penalties imposed by provisions codified in subchapter 68B. I.R.C. §
6671(a) (2012). Accordingly, because the Anti-Injunction Act is part of the Internal Revenue
Code, it applies to assessable penalties included in subchapter 68B.
21. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 545.
22. See id. (interpreting this language merely as a procedural directive to the Secretary of
the Treasury to employ assessment and collection mechanisms with respect to the penalty
similar to those mechanisms used to assess and collect taxes).
23. Id. at 546.
24. Id.
25. Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2429 (June 6, 2016).
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Subchapter 68B of the Internal Revenue Code.26
The Sebelius decision was controversial because the Court held that the
individual health insurance mandate exceeded Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause but that it was a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing
power.27 Although Congress may designate an exaction a penalty for
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, whether an exaction is a penalty or a tax
for constitutional purposes depends on the nature of the exaction and not the
label that Congress chooses to give it.28 For constitutional purposes, several
factors caused the shared responsibility payment to resemble a tax (including
the fact that it is paid with tax returns): it is inapplicable to low-income
households; its amount is based on factors such as income, the number of
dependents, and income tax filing status; it is codified in the Internal
Revenue Code; and it is enforced by the I.R.S.29
The distinguishing feature of a penalty is its punishment of an unlawful
act or omission; the Court determined that the statute’s provision of an
inducement to purchase insurance need not be interpreted to make the failure
to do so unlawful.30 The majority opinion discussed the three characteristics
of penalties that were set forth in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, the child labor

26. Id. at 1067.
27. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 547-575.
28. Id. at 564.
29. Id. at 563-564. The dissenting Justices found these features unpersuasive for two
reasons. Id. at 666-669 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). They disagreed
that variations in the amount of an exaction are indicative of taxes and gave no credence to
section 5000A’s codification in the Internal Revenue Code. Id. They pointed out that the
amounts of numerous penalties are influenced by the violators’ ability to pay and, moreover,
that the placement of the mandate in the operative provisions of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, rather than in its revenue provisions, is evidence that the shared
responsibility payment was enacted as a penalty. Id.
30. Id. at 567 (first citing United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.,
518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996); then citing United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)).
The fact that no consequences attach to the failure to purchase insurance, other than the
requirement to pay the exaction at issue, and the fact that the Congressional Budget Office
estimated that four million people would choose to pay the tax and remain uninsured belie
that Congress intended that the failure to obtain insurance be considered unlawful. Id. at 568.
In Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922), the Court held that a provision of the National
Prohibition Act that taxed profits from the illegal sale of alcohol at double the rate otherwise
applicable to legal profits was a penalty and not a tax. Id. at 561-62. Because evidence of a
crime was required for the tax to apply, the exaction in question was intended to punish
violations of the National Prohibition Act and, hence, was a penalty. An alternative
framework with which to decide whether an exaction is a penalty or a tax was proposed by
Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to
Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 U. VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012) (arguing that
the classification of an exaction should be based on whether Congress rationally believed that
the exaction would reduce or prevent the behavior on which the exaction is imposed).
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tax case.31 First, a penalty imposes an exceedingly heavy burden regardless
of the extent of the infraction.32 Second, penalties typically include scienter
requirements.33 Finally, penalties are enforced by agencies other than the
I.R.S., an agency whose function is to collect revenue.34 The shared
responsibility payment does not impose an exceedingly heavy burden
because, for most individuals, the amount due will be far less than the cost
of insurance and can never exceed the cost of such insurance.35 Moreover,
further support for the categorization of the shared responsibility payment as
a tax is the lack of any scienter requirement, its assessment and collection by
the I.R.S. through normal means, and the statute’s prohibition of the use of
criminal sanctions, liens, and levies.36
In light of the Sebelius decision, it appears that if Congress labels an
exaction of a penalty that falls outside of the statutory definition of a tax,
then the Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable to that exaction regardless of the
nature of the exaction. Moreover, it appears that the reverse is also true. If
Congress labels an exaction a tax, it is subject to the Anti-Injunction Act
regardless of its constitutional status as a penalty. In Drexel Furniture, the
Court held that a statute enacted in 1919 that imposed a ten percent excise
tax on the net profits of an enterprise that employed children was
unconstitutional because, according to the Court, the tax was, in reality, a
penalty.37 Drexel Furniture and Sebelius are analogous in that the taxing
31. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 565.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 565-566.
34. Id. at 566.
35. Id. A discussion of the statutory cap on the amount of the shared responsibility
payment is available at footnote 14 of this text.
36. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 566. Taxes as a means to regulate behavior were sanctioned by
the Court long ago. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940). For
example, the Court upheld the validity of a significant increase in excise taxes applicable to
certain coal producers who did not join the Bituminous Coal Code, a group subject to
regulation and price setting by a government commission:
Clearly this tax is not designed merely for revenue purposes. In purpose and
effect it is primarily a sanction to enforce the regulatory provisions of the Act.
But that does not mean that the statute is invalid and the tax unenforceable.
Congress may impose penalties in aid of the exercise of any its enumerated
powers. The power of taxation, granted to Congress by the Constitution, may be
utilized as a sanction for the exercise of another power which is granted it.
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940).
37. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922). This case was decided
approximately four years after Hammer v. Dagenhart, in which the Court held that it was not
within Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce to enact a ban on the interstate
transportation of goods manufactured with the use of child labor. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Hammer was overruled by United States v. Darby, one of a series of cases that expanded the
scope of the commerce power after the so-called “switch in time that saved nine” in the New
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power was posited in both cases as justification for a legislative action that
was not supportable by the commerce power. However, a companion case
to Drexel Furniture was not decided on the merits. The Court held in that
case that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the issuance of an injunction that
prevented the assessment and collection of the tax.38
B. Purpose of Suit
The Anti-Injunction Act applies to a “suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax.”39 A taxpayer’s purpose for seeking
relief is, in the vast majority of cases, transparent—to reduce her tax liability.
On occasion, however, taxpayers have asserted alternative purposes for their
challenges. For example, in Bob Jones, the petitioner challenged the I.R.S.’s
denial of tax exempt status.40 Such denial was predicated on the petitioner’s
racially discriminatory policies and threatened the petitioner’s fund raising
objectives because its tax exempt status was necessary in order for donors to
obtain a tax deduction for their donations to the petitioner.41 Moreover,
denial of tax exempt status would subject the organization to federal income
taxes and certain payroll tax obligations.42 The petitioner argued that its suit
was not for the “purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
tax” but to maintain its flow of donor contributions.43 The Court held that
the suit was precluded by the Anti-Injunction Act because the petitioner’s
challenge implicated its liability for income taxes, payroll taxes, and also the
tax liability of others—its donors.44 Consequently, this action fell “within
the literal scope and the purposes of the Act.”45 The Court reached a similar
conclusion in a decision that was rendered the same day in a companion case,
Alexander v. Americans United Inc.46 The Court made clear that the AntiInjunction Act’s applicability is neither predicated on a taxpayer seeking to
restrain the assessment or collection of its own taxes nor on whether the

Deal era. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
38. Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16, 20 (1922).
39. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
40. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
41. Id. at 727-36; see also I.R.C. §§ 170(a); 501(c)(3) (2012).
42. Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 730-31. The deleterious effects of the denial or revocation of
tax exempt status on an organization led Congress, in 1976, to amend the Declaratory
Judgment Act to provide an exception for actions that challenge such denials or revocations.
See supra note 4.
43. Id. at 738.
44. Id. at 738-39. The Court acknowledged that, due to various deductions, whether the
petitioner would owe income taxes was open to debate. Id. at 738.
45. Id. at 739.
46. Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
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effect on the taxpayer is merely collateral.47
In a relatively recent case, the D.C. Circuit held that a suit that
challenged the legality of a refund process established by the I.R.S. related
to telephone excise taxes paid but later found invalid was not barred by the
Anti-Injunction Act.48 The court held that because the tax in question had
already been assessed and collected by the I.R.S. that the suit did not seek to
restrain the assessment or collection of any tax. Instead, the suit challenged
the procedures established the I.R.S. under which money would be
refunded.49 The court distinguished this case from both Bob Jones and
Alexander on the grounds that, unlike those cases, this case did not impact
the future tax liabilities of the taxpayer.50 Moreover, the Court rejected a
“single mechanism” theory of assessment and collection under which any
suit that affects the money retained by the Treasury involves assessment and
collection.51 Instead, the court held that the terms assessment and collection,
for purposes of the Act, are to be defined as those terms are defined in the
Internal Revenue Code.52 In this case, the taxes in question had long been
assessed and collected. With respect to the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act
the Court stated that “[t]he principle the case law elucidates is therefore quite
simple: The AIA, as its plain text states, bars suits concerning the
‘assessment or collection of any tax.’ It is no obstacle to other claims seeking
to enjoin the IRS, regardless of any attenuated connection to the broader
regulatory scheme.”53
The Court’s rejection of a “single mechanism” theory of assessment and
collection in this case followed from its reasoning in Foodservice & Lodging
Institute v. Regan several decades earlier.54 At issue in that case were several
regulatory provisions that implemented a restaurant tip reporting statute.
One provision required restaurants to report total charge receipts and total
charged tips.55 The regulations, in contrast, required restaurants to report
only charge receipts in which a tip was charged.56 The regulation was
challenged by the food service industry because the industry believed that
the information that the regulation required to be provided tended to
overstate tips.57 The court held that the statutory provision in question was
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 760-61.
Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 725.
Id. at 726 n.7.
Id. at 726.
Id.
Id. at 727.
Foodservice & Lodging Inst. v. Regan, 809 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 846.
Id.
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enacted to assist the I.R.S. is determining the extent of tip reporting
compliance in the food service industry and, therefore, the challenge to the
regulation did not implicate the assessment of collection of tax.58 The extent
of industry-wide compliance with a reporting requirement and the
assessment and collection of tax is not too attenuated because evidence of
significant noncompliance would most likely lead to regulatory measures to
counter such noncompliance. However, the D.C. Circuit disagreed and
applied the Anti-Injunction narrowly.59
Most recently, the D.C. Circuit held that the Anti-Injunction Act did not
bar a suit by an organization that alleged that the I.R.S. was unlawfully
delaying a decision regarding its tax exempt status because the
organization’s political views were inconsistent with the Obama
Administration’s Middle East policies.60 The court distinguished this case
from Cohen, the telephone excise tax case discussed above, because this case
did have potential tax implications for the taxpayer in the future.61 However,
in contrast to Bob Jones and Alexander, the taxpayer in this case was not
seeking tax exempt status but only a fair and lawful process in the
determination of its status.62 The court’s decision was based, in large part,
on its belief that the organization would be left with no adequate remedy if
its suit was barred—an exception to the application of the statute discussed
later in this Article.63 However, the court did indicate that the suit was not
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax but
merely to prevent the I.R.S. from processing its request in an unconstitutional
manner.64 It is not clear whether the court would have held similarly if it
believed the taxpayer had an adequate remedy at its disposal. Quite possibly,
the court would not have so held because if the action did not involve an
attempt to restrain the assessment of collection of any tax then it would have
found no need to dwell on the taxpayer’s lack of an adequate remedy.
The importance of the revenue collection function for the operation of
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Z St. v. Koskinen, 791 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Similar issues were raised by a
number of tax-exempt organizations and the allegations that the I.R.S. was discriminating
against conservative organizations led to Congressional hearings and political headaches for
the Obama Administration. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION,
Ref. No. 2013-10-053, INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT
APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013), available at
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FHQ9-ZZJV] (discussing allegations of I.R.S. discrimination against
conservative organizations).
61. Z St., 791 F.3d at 31.
62. Id. at 30.
63. Id. at 31-32.
64. Id. at 32.
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the government provides the justification for the statutory bar to preenforcement challenges to tax rules but this statutory bar is by no means the
only evidence that the tax function is administered in a manner unlike the
administration of other government functions. Statutorily, the Treasury,
with few exceptions, has been placed in an enviable position in comparison
to other agencies. Moreover, the Treasury has appropriated for itself various
advantages that have been subject to much criticism and that, in light of
recent developments, may be curtailed.
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND TAX EXCEPTIONALISM

The Anti-Injunction Act recognizes the importance of the federal
government’s revenue collection function and is a manifestation of tax
exceptionalism, the belief that the administration of the tax laws is justifiably
different than the administration of other laws. However, the Act is not the
sole manifestation of this belief. Various statutes advantage the Treasury in
its dealings with taxpayers.65 Moreover, the Treasury has enjoyed
remarkable latitude in its rulemaking with respect to the restrictions imposed
on administrative agencies by the Administrative Procedure Act.
Alarm at the increasing power of executive branch agencies,
particularly during World War II, the diminishing popularity of the
Democratic Party, and the courts’ reluctance to limit agency power led to the
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.66 The objectives of
65. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7805(b)(1)(C), 7805(b)(2) (2012) (permitting tax regulations to
have retroactive effect in certain circumstances). Regulations, including re-issued
regulations, may take effect on the date that notice was issued to the public that substantially
described the expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final regulations. Id.
Moreover, regulations that are filed or issued within eighteen months of the date that the
statute to which the regulations relate was enacted may have retroactive effect. Id.
(permitting tax regulations to have retroactive effect). General administrative law principles
are less amenable to agency retroactive rulemaking. See e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (finding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services did
not have authority to impose retroactive cost-limit rules). In addition, the I.R.S. has broad
collection powers that private creditors can only envy. See generally Steve R. Johnson, The
IRS as Super Creditor, 92 TAX NOTES 655 (2001) (contemplating the unique powers of
the I.R.S. relative to private creditors). Not all idiosyncrasies of tax administration favor the
government, however. In tax litigation, no deference is given to the I.R.S.’s factual
determinations, which are subject to de novo review. See James M. Puckett, Structural Tax
Exceptionalism, 49 GA. L. REV. 1067, 1103-09 (2015) (discussing the treatment of I.R.S.
determinations in tax litigation). See also Diane L. Fahey, Is the United States Tax Court
Exempt from Administrative Law Jurisprudence When Acting as a Reviewing Court?, 58
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603, 637-43 (2010) (considering the deference given by the U.S. Tax
Court to I.R.S. conclusions of fact).
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2012); Anthony W. Mongone, Note, Business
Roundtable: A New Level of Judicial Scrutiny and its Implications in a Post-Dodd-Frank
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the Act are to inform the public about agencies’ procedures, rules, and
organization; provide the public with the opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking process; establish standards for the promulgation of rules and
adjudicating disputes; and set forth the scope of judicial review of agencies’
actions.67 With certain exceptions, the Act requires that notice and comment
procedures be adhered to in the promulgation of proposed regulations.68
However, the notice and comment requirements do not apply to interpretive
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice.69 Moreover, notice and comment procedures may be
dispensed with if the agency finds, with good cause, that such procedures are
impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.70 As discussed
World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 746, 770-85 (2012). The federal government’s role in
the nation’s economic affairs increased in response to the industrialization of the economy
during the nineteenth century and to the post-Civil War need to protect the newly acquired
rights of African-Americans. Lawrence M. Friedman, Friedman, A History of American
Law, 439-466 (2d. ed. 1985). The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887
marked the birth of what would become an immense federal bureaucracy and the
Progressive period resulted in the increased regulation of railroads, the institution of
occupational licensing, and the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. (considering
how the Lochner era proved to be a temporary reprieve to the increasing role of the public
sector in private enterprise); see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a
New York statute regulating the hours of bakers was an unconstitutional infringement on the
right and liberty to contract). The Lochner era, in my opinion, closed with the Court’s
decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish. This decision upheld the constitutionality of
Washington state’s minimum wage law and overturned an earlier precedent to the contrary,
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937). The Supreme Court’s initial resistance to expansive federal powers over
economic matters came to an end with its decision in the seminal case of N.L.R.B. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935). Several years later, the Court laid to rest any doubts as to the
extent of the federal commerce power. See Wickard v. Filburn., 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(holding that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to
regulate activity that has an indirect effect on such commerce).
67. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 9 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons 1973). This source also provides a detailed
description and analysis of the statute.
68. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)-(b) (2010). In general, final regulations may not take effect within
30 days after notice is given. However, this requirement is inapplicable to regulations that
relieve burdens on those persons subject to the regulations. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(1) (2010). Tax
regulations that are favorable to taxpayers may be insulated from taxpayer challenges due to
lack of standing. Not all taxpayer-friendly regulations will be so insulated, however. See
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (holding that standing was no barrier to
challenges to Treasury regulations that interpreted the availability of tax credits provided by
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in a manner favorable to taxpayers because
the availability of tax credits could cause a taxpayer to be subject to the so-called individual
mandate, the requirement to purchase health insurance).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2010).
70. Id. An agency that invokes the good cause exception must set forth its reasons for
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later in this Article, agencies also must provide reasoned explanations for
their actions, a requirement that offers some assurance that agency actions
do not implicate separation of powers issues, provides a modicum of political
accountability, and potentially improves the quality of agency decisions.71
The Treasury has been rather cavalier with the Administrative
Procedure Act. The Treasury derives its regulatory authority from two
sources. First, Congress may delegate it the authority to issue rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of a specific statute within the statute
itself. That regulatory authority typically is phrased in broad terms, such as
the authority to prescribe regulations as may be necessary and appropriate to
carry out the statutory provisions in question, but it is not uncommon for
Congress to reference specific provisions of the statute in its grant of
authority indicating its expectation that regulations will be forthcoming with
respect to those provisions.72 I.R.C. section 7805(a), which delegates general
regulatory authority to the Treasury for the enforcement of the tax laws, is a
second source of regulatory authority.73
The Treasury took the frequently criticized position that regulations
issued under section 7805 were interpretative and, therefore, not subject to
the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.74
doing so. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2010). The Attorney General’s Manual and the courts have
interpreted the good cause exception to apply in cases when timely guidance is critical and
the notice and comment requirement would impose an impediment to such timely guidance,
minor rules with little public interest, and the somewhat unusual case in which notice and
comment would be counterproductive. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines:
Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act
Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1781-82 (2007).
71. See Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L. J.
1771, 1788 (2014) (reflecting on the reasoned explanation requirement). See also infra notes
98-113 and accompanying text.
72. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 263A(i), 409A(e), 469(l) (2012).
73. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012). With certain exceptions, proposed, temporary, or final
regulations cannot have retroactive effect. I.R.C. § 7805(b). Temporary regulations must
also be issued in the form of proposed regulations and expire within three years of their
issuance. I.R.C. § 7805(e). All published proposed and temporary regulations must be
submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for
comment on the impact that such regulations will have on small business. I.R.C. § 7805(f).
The Treasury must consider comments from the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration and discuss any response to such comments in the preamble to final
regulations. Id.
74. See Kristen E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1158 n.16. (citing a study that found, in 232 regulatory projects studied,
that the notice and comment requirement was explicitly disclaimed in almost 92 percent of
such projects). See also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S.
44, 55-58 (2011) (applying the same standard of deference to regulations issued under a
general grant of authority that is applied to other regulations); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
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Moreover, the increasing complexity of tax law, particularly after the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, prompted the Treasury to issue
rules in the form of temporary regulations which are binding upon taxpayers
without any opportunity for pre-promulgation comments by interested
parties.75 Congress responded in 1988 by enacting I.R.C. section 7805I,
which mandated the issuance of temporary regulations contemporaneously
with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and required that such temporary
regulations expire within three years.76
The I.R.S. regularly engages in informal rulemaking through the
issuance of Revenue Rulings and Notices, neither of which are subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act.77 Rulings are designed to apply the law to a
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (stating that oftentimes legislative delegations
are implicit); Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2008)
(holding that regulations promulgated pursuant to I.R.C. section 7805 have the force of law);
Hickman, supra note 74, at 1760-73. See also ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task
Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW 717 (2004) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report]
(discussing the Treasury’s use of Temporary Regulations). Congress exhibited a modicum of
concern with this practice and expressly required the Treasury to comply with the provisions
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act regardless of whether the regulations were legislative or
interpretative. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2010).
75. Hickman, supra note 74, at 1160. See Michael Asimov, Public Participation in the
Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW 343, 343 (1991) (questioning whether
the Treasury’s use of temporary regulations complied with the Administrative Procedure Act).
In a study conducted by Professor Hickman, the Treasury frequently asserted that the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply to regulations, whether
temporary or final, due to the good cause exception. See Hickman, supra note 74, at 174951.
76. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6232(a),
102 Stat. 3342, 3734-35 (1988) (codified at I.R.C. § 7805(e) & (f)). Recently, the Treasury
issued temporary and proposed regulations to hinder inversion and post-inversion transactions
pursuant to which a domestic corporation relocates its domicile in a low tax jurisdiction but
maintains significant operations in the country of its former domicile. See generally Temp.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.304-7T; 1,367(a)-3T; 1.367(b)-4T; 1.956-2T;1,7701(l)-4T;1.7874-1T-4T;
1.7874-6T-12T (2016). The issuance of these regulations reportedly scuttled the pending
Pfizer-Allergan merger, as well as other pending transactions. Katie Thomas & Chad Bray,
Pfizer Weighs Split as Allergan Deal Collapses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2016, at B1; Domenic
Chopping & Ben Tita, Tax Inversion Rules Complicate Crane Deal, WALL ST. J., April 28,
2016, at B3 (reporting that the new rules could derail a merger between Terex Corp. and
Konecranes Oyj); see infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
77. Revenue Rulings are official, published interpretations of the tax law applicable to a
particular set of facts and are designed to both promote the uniform application of the tax
laws and to assist in taxpayers’ compliance with such laws. See Rev. Proc. 2003-1, C.B. 1
(Jan. 2003) (stating that the revenue procedure explains to taxpayers the kind of guidance
the Service provides, how to request it, and how it is provided); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1
C.B. 814, 814-15 (Jan. 1989) (setting forth the standards for publication of rulings and
procedures). Rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations, although they may be
used as precedent by taxpayers. 26 C.F.R. § 601.601 (d)(2)(v)(d). The deference that a
court will afford Notices, in comparison to Revenue Rulings, is unclear. Compare
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specific set of facts and, to that extent, can be fairly described as
interpretative. Notices, however, are often used to provide guidance pending
the issuance of a ruling or proposed regulations and frequently contain
substantive interpretations of the tax law. Although Notices provide
taxpayers with welcome guidance pending the conclusion of formal
rulemaking, they also have been used to advance controversial positions
without any opportunity for public comment.78
The Anti-Injunction Act imposes a significant procedural obstacle to
taxpayers who wish to challenge the legality of burdensome formal or
informal Treasury rules. With respect to allegedly unlawful rules that confer
a benefit on all or a portion of the taxpayer population, the Treasury is
immune to legal challenges and its actions are subject only to political
repercussions—a result of the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence.79
Constantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 980-81 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that Revenue
Rulings are entitled to greater deference) with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.
78, 99 (1993) (stating that Revenue Rulings and Notices are entitled to equal deference).
78. Perhaps the best example of the use of Notices in this manner was Notice 2008-83.
This Notice, issued during the height of the financial crisis in 2008, was criticized by tax
experts and members of Congress as a bailout to the banking industry. See Matthew A.
Melone, A Leg to Stand On: Is There a Legal and Prudential Solution to the Problem of
Taxpayer Standing in the Federal Tax Context?, 9 PITT. TAX REV. 111-14 (2012).
79. Federal taxpayer standing jurisprudence had its genesis in the 1923 case Frothingham
v. Mellon. In that case, a taxpayer alleged that federal expenditures under a statute increased
her tax bill in violation of due process. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The
Court denied the taxpayer standing because the effect of the expenditures on her federal tax
liability was “so remote, fluctuating, and uncertain” and that “his interest in moneys of the
Treasury . . . is shared with millions of others.” Id. at 487. Per the Court, federal judicial
power can be invoked by a party upon a showing “not only that the statute is invalid, but that
he has sustained . . . some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” Id. at 488. The Court has
been similarly unreceptive to suits brought by members of Congress that allege an institutional
injury but have allowed allegations of personal injury to proceed. See Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811 (1997) (finding that Congress members did not have standing based solely on loss
of political power); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (allowing suit where member
of House of Representatives was excluded despite meeting the Article I Section 2 standing
requirements of the Constitution); see also Shays v. FEC, 414 F. 3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(affirming that congressmen had standing to bring suit where the FEC exposed them to
competition intensified by BCRA-banned practices and deprivation of fair reelection
contests). Legislators may have standing to challenge executive action in the absence of a
particularized individual harm if they have undertaken the challenge in a representational
capacity. For example, a committee of the House of Representatives had standing to enforce
a subpoena issued by the committee to a member of the executive branch. Comm. On
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2008).
See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983) (stating, in dicta, that “Congress is the
proper party to defend the validity of a statute when a Government agency, as a defendant
charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is unconstitutional”).
In United States v. Windsor, the case that struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, the
Bipartisan Litigation Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives petitioned to
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The objectives of the Administrative Procedure Act are laudable, but
the Act has its critics. The procedural requirements imposed on agencies can
result in delays in the issuance of needed guidance or the reluctance to issue
guidance due to the fear of legal challenges.80 Moreover, compliance with
the Act is costly and such compliance often does little to prevent well-heeled
or influential parties from controlling the information upon which an agency
formulates its guidance.81 The negative consequences of compliance with
the Act are not unique to tax rulemaking but, given the reach of the tax laws
and general antipathy toward tax compliance, such consequences are
particularly deleterious in the tax area.82 As previously noted, the law has
recognized, in various ways, the exceptional nature of the government’s
revenue collection function.83 The Anti-Injunction Act is perhaps the most
prominent example of tax exceptionalism.
In recent years, the extent to which tax rules are permitted to exist apart
from the general population of administrative rules has been called into
question. In 2011, the Supreme Court seemingly handed the Treasury a
major victory with respect to the deference that its tax regulations enjoy. 84
However, that victory may have come at a steep price because the Court
pointedly rejected the notion of tax exceptionalism.85 As a result, Treasury
actions have been subject to challenge under administrative law doctrines
that were rarely, if ever, applied to tax rules.
A. Deference: A Crack in the Armor of Tax Exceptionalism
The seminal case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. held that a very deferential standard of review was applicable

intervene to defend the statute as an interested party after being notified by the Attorney
General that the Department of Justice would not defend the statute’s constitutionality. 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013). While the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether BLAG had
standing on its own right, Justices Alito and Thomas believed that BLAG did have standing,
and would maintain the standing of a member of Congress to defend the constitutionality of
any statute provided that the member has the institutional imprimatur to do so. Id. at 26862688.
80. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, The Perfect Process is the Enemy of the Good Tax:
Tax’s Exceptional Regulatory Process, 35 VA. TAX REV. 553, 579-580 (2016) (explaining
that pre-notice rulemaking requires a serious commitment of agency resources when it comes
to issuing guidance).
81. Id. at 583-85.
82. Id. at 589-602, 611-12.
83. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
84. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011)
(holding that the Chevron standard applied to all Treasury regulations issued after notice and
comment).
85. Id. at 55-56.
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to agency action that had been subject to notice and comment. 86 This
standard employs a two-step inquiry. Step one inquires whether the subject
of the agency action directly addresses the precise question at issue and, if
not, step two inquires whether the agency action is arbitrary, capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.87 So long as the statute is
sufficiently ambiguous, agency action will not be disturbed unless it is
arbitrary, capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.88
86. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Deference to agency
actions existed long before the Chevron decision. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the Court held
the level of deference that an agency’s action warrants depends upon the thoroughness of the
agency’s deliberations, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and other factors which provide the agency with the power to persuade. 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944). This rather vague standard was thought not to offer meaningful
guidance by Justice Scalia. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (opining that this standard’s resort to the totality of the circumstances is not
practical in the modern administrative state). In 1979, the Court applied a multi-factor test—
the so-called National Muffler test—to determine whether Treasury regulations issued under
the general authority of I.R.C. section 7805(a) were a permissible interpretation of a statute.
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979). The Court
examined whether the regulations in question were a contemporaneous construction of the
statute promulgated with the awareness of congressional intent, the length of time that the
regulations were in effect, the degree of reliance placed on the regulations by affected parties,
the consistency of the agency’s position, and the degree of scrutiny given the regulations by
Congress during subsequent re-enactments of the statute. Id. The Court later applied this test
in two cases decided not long after its National Muffler decision and, in both cases, noted that
less deference is owed to Treasury interpretations issued pursuant to I.R.C. section 7805.
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United States,
452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-844. The Chevron two-step test is more deferential than
the National Muffler test in several respects. For example, under Chevron, whether the
agency’s action is consistent with its previous position on the matter at hand and whether the
regulation had been issued contemporaneously with the statute are not relevant to the level of
deference due the agency. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 1001 n.4 (2005) (stating that the lack of consistency does not undermine the
case for deference); Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 748 (2004)
(deferring to a regulation that upset a longstanding agency position to the contrary); Smiley
v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) (applying Chevron deference to regulations issued
approximately a century after the enactment of the statute). Moreover, the Court has held that
Chevron deference is owed to regulations that are contrary to previous judicial holdings
regarding the meaning of statutory terms. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981-982 (deferring to an
agency interpretation that was a reversal of actual agency policy).
88. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. Chevron deference is not always applicable to regulations
that clarify statutory ambiguities. In King v. Burwell, the Court upheld Treasury regulations
that made available tax credits to purchasers of health insurance on federal exchanges. 135
S. Ct. 2480 (2015). However, the Court did not apply Chevron. Id. According to the Court,
deference under Chevron is premised on the notion that statutory ambiguities “constitutes an
implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.” Id. at 2488
(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). This
premise may not be warranted in extraordinary cases and this was such a case.
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Chevron was premised on prudential grounds and acknowledged that the
modern administrative state demands that agencies possess specialized
knowledge beyond the “ordinary knowledge” possessed by the courts.89 The
expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than district judges
issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific,
economic, and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with
issues of this order.”90 Ostensibly, Chevron pays fealty to congressional
intent and separation of powers, but its constitutional underpinning should
not be exaggerated.91
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars in
spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of
people. Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a
question of deep “economic and political significance” that is central to this
statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it
surely would have done so expressly. It is especially unlikely that Congress
would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting
health insurance policy of this sort. This is not a case for the IRS.
Id. at 2489 (internal citations omitted).
89. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
90. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011). Chevron also rested
on the notion of congressional intent and the concomitant political accountability that follows.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Judicial deference to agency action is warranted because “[t]he
power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” Id. at 843. Critics often question the political
legitimacy of agency actions because of the inordinate influence that the regulated
constituency often exerts over the regulator, influence that is based, in part, on resource and
information disparities, political influence, and the revolving door between agencies and their
regulated constituents. David J. Arkush, Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1458, 1473-75 (2013). The House of Representatives passed the
Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016), which would
require de novo judicial review of all relevant questions of law and agency rules.
91. The link between the Constitution and Chevron is tenuous. Deference is invited by
sweeping delegations of authority from Congress to agencies. Such delegations may either
violate separation of powers principles or come close to doing so. As the Court made clear
in Field v. Clark, Congress cannot delegate its Article I legislative powers. 143 U.S. 649, 692
(1892). Additionally, broad delegations of regulatory authority to agencies may constitute an
impermissible delegation by Congress of its legislative authority. The Court has applied an
“intelligible principle” test, described in Mistretta v. United States, to determine whether a
congressional delegation is too broad:
Applying this “intelligible principle” test to congressional delegations, our
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives. Accordingly, this Court has deemed it
“constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the
public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”
488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (internal citations omitted).
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Scholars have debated whether the two steps of the Chevron test are
redundant. Stephenson and Vermeule assert that “[t]he single question is
whether the agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory
interpretation; the two Chevron steps both ask the question, just in different
ways. As a result, the two steps are mutually convertible.”92 Richard Re, in
a compelling counterargument, asserted that Chevron step one provides the
answer to the question of whether Congress left only one permissible
interpretation of a statute.93 If, under Chevron step one, a genuine statutory
ambiguity exists, then Chevron step two defers to any number of
interpretations, so long as they are reasonable.94
The standard by which courts were to determine whether and to what
extent to defer to Treasury regulations issued under I.R.C. section 7805(a)
was set forth in National Muffler not long before the Chevron decision.95
After Chevron, the continuing vitality of the National Muffler standard was
unclear due to a distinction between explicit and implicit delegations
seemingly made by Chevron itself.96 Some commentators, including the

The Administrative Procedure Act precludes judicial review of actions committed to
agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(2) (2012). The Court has held that this exception
is to be construed narrowly, applicable in the rare instances where the statutory terms are so
broad that there is no law to apply. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410-11 (1971). The non-delegation doctrine set forth in Mistretta appears to be in tension
with the “no law to apply” standard set forth in Overton Park. See Viktoria Lovei, Revealing
the True Definition of APA § 701(a)(2) by Reconciling “No Law to Apply” with the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (2006) (explaining that when Congress
passes a statute that confers a large degree of authority upon the executive, there is a conflict
between the non-delegation doctrine and the agency discretion exception of the
Administrative Procedure Act). Moreover, a constitutional underpinning to Chevron
putatively renders any statutory rejection or limitation on judicial deference unconstitutional.
For example, the Freedom of Information Act mandates de novo review of government actions
to withhold records from the public. Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery, and FOIA, 73
MD. L. REV. 1060 (2014).
92. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L.
REV. 597, 599 (2009).
93. Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L. J. 605, 610-16 (2014).
94. Id.
95. National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
96. The Court stated:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
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American Bar Association, believed that Chevron set forth two separate steptwos: an arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute test for
regulations promulgated under explicit congressional delegations of
authority, and a less deferential reasonable interpretation standard for
regulations promulgated under implicit congressional delegations of
authority.97 Consequently, the deference afforded to regulations issued
pursuant to I.R.C. section 7805(a) by National Muffler is appropriate after
Chevron.98
After Chevron, the Court continued to apply the National Muffler test,
somewhat inconsistently and often confusingly, to Treasury regulations
issued under I.R.C. section 7805.99 As a result, confusion and contradiction
emanated from the lower courts and the Tax Court as to whether Chevron
replaced National Muffler, whether they are in fact similar, and when to
apply one standard versus the other.100 Critics of the application of Chevron
97. See Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration in Light
of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAWYER 481, 495
(2008) (explaining that the Chevron Court set forth two standards: an “arbitrary-andcapricious standard” and “a permissible-construction standard”); ABA Task Force Report,
supra note 74, at 739 (asserting that specific authority regulations are subject to an “ arbitrary
and capricious” standard while general authority regulations are subject to a “reasonableness”
standard).
98. Id. at 737-38. The Court made clear that the Skidmore standard survived Chevron at
least with respect to informal rulemaking. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
234-36 (2001) (explaining that Chevron did not overrule Skidmore and stating that this case
may lend itself to a Skidmore claim); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000) (stating that Skidmore deference is applicable to informal agency actions such as
opinion letters, manuals, guidelines, and policy statements); Nelson v. Comm’r, 568 F.3d 662,
665 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying Skidmore deference to revenue rulings); Kornman & Assoc., v.
U.S., 527 F.3d 443, 452-57 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding that revenue rulings are entitled to
Skidmore deference). Not everyone has concluded revenue rulings are entitled to Skidmore
deference. See Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. U.S., 522 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir.
2008) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (concluding that Chevron deference was appropriate for
a Revenue Procedure). The Department of Justice has indicated that it will not argue for the
application of Chevron deference to revenue rulings and revenue procedures. See Marie
Sapirie, DOJ Won’t Argue for Chevron Deference for Revenue Rulings and Procedures,
Official Says, 131 TAX NOTES 674 (2011) (reporting on the Justice Department’s decision not
to argue for Chevron deference and citing Gilbert Rothenberg, the acting deputy assistant
attorney general in the DOJ’s Tax Division).
99. See Berg, supra note 97, at 502 (noting that since Chevron, “the Tax Court as well as
the courts of appeals have been wrestling with the question of Chevron’s effect (if any) on the
National Muffler standard”); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1579-86 (2006) (describing
the inconsistency in the courts’ application of deference standards to tax cases).
100. Berg, supra note 97, at 500-16 (discussing a number of Circuit Court cases and Tax
Court cases in which different standards were applied). In one case, the Tax Court stated that
the National Muffler standard “has not been changed by Chevron, but has merely been restated
in a practical two-part test with possibly subtle distinctions as to the role of legislative history
and the degree of deference to be accorded to a regulation.” Cent. Pa. Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r,
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to tax regulations asserted a sort of tax exceptionalism pursuant to which a
lesser standard of deference was justified for tax regulations.101
In 2011, the Court’s decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical
Education & Research v. United States dismissed notions of tax
exceptionalism and held that the Chevron standard applied to all Treasury
regulations issued after notice and comment.102 Mayo upheld a tax regulation
promulgated pursuant to the general grant of authority under I.R.C. section
7805 that denied medical residents an exemption from payroll taxes.103 The
Court forcefully rejected the notion that tax regulations are somehow entitled
to less deference than the regulatory action of other agencies.
Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less
deferential standard of review to Treasury Department regulations
than we apply to the rules of any other agency. In the absence of
such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to
administrative review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we
have expressly “[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.” . . .
Filling gaps in the Internal Revenue Code plainly requires the
Treasury Department to make interpretive choices for statutory
implementation at least as complex as the ones other agencies must
make in administering their statutes. . . . We see no reason why
our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency
expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of
other regulations.104
104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995).
101. According to some, the inherent advantages enjoyed by the I.R.S. over taxpayers, the
severity of tax penalties, the sweep of the revenue collection function, and the complexity of
the tax code justify special treatment for tax administration. See ABA Task Force Report,
supra note 74, at 723-25 (highlighting the advantages enjoyed by the I.R.S.). The idea of tax
exceptionalism is not universally held. See Hickman, supra note 99, at 1592-98 (disagreeing
with the arguments of tax exceptionalists, who believe that a more “diluted” version of
Chevron should be applied to general authority Treasury regulations).
102. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55-57 (2011).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 55-56. The Court also made clear the distinction between the Chevron and
National Muffler standards and why the former is significantly more deferential than the latter.
Id. at 54-55. Chevron left a number of issues—tax and otherwise—unresolved and Mayo did
not resolve all deference questions with respect to Treasury actions. Two scholars posed
fourteen questions that they believe Chevron left unanswered in addition to the basic question
of whether there are certain subject matters for which deference is not appropriate. See
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L. J. 833, 849-52
(2001) (identifying the unresolved questions that have come up in lower courts and that have
led to circuit splits). For example, whether Chevron deference is predicated on the issuance
of regulations after notice and comment is not clear. Mayo hinted that notice and comment is
a prerequisite for Chevron deference but did not say so categorically. “The Department issued
the full-time employee rule only after notice-and-comment procedures, again a consideration
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After Mayo, the deference to which Treasury regulations issued after
notice and comment are entitled no longer depends upon their source of
authority. Mayo, therefore, was a win for the Treasury, and it may embolden
the Treasury to exercise its interpretative authority more aggressively, or,
alternatively, it will provide an impetus for the Treasury to submit to notice
and comment procedures more frequently.105 It may do both. Mayo,
however, ultimately may prove to be a hollow victory. The Court’s
unequivocal rejection of tax exceptionalism in that case has opened the door
to the application of general administrative law principles that have largely
gone unnoticed in the tax area.

identified in our precedents as a ‘significant’ sign that a rule merits Chevron deference.”
Mayo, 562 U.S. at 57-58 (first quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31
(2001), and then quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173-74
(2007)). Thus, whether temporary Treasury regulations are entitled to Chevron deference is
unlikely, and, if not, whether National Muffler or Skidmore deference should apply is unclear.
The Seventh Circuit, however, indicated that it would apply Chevron deference to temporary
regulations, at least those that have been replaced by nearly identical final regulations issued
after notice and comment:
This temporary regulation, which was issued without notice and comment at the
same time as an identical proposed regulation, purports to offer taxpayers
guidance by resolving an open question and stating definitively that in the case
of a disposition of property, an overstatement of basis can lead to an omission
from gross income. This temporary regulation has since been replaced by a nearly
identical final regulation, issued after a notice and comment period. Because we
find that Colony is not controlling, we need not reach this issue. However, we
would have been inclined to grant the temporary regulation Chevron deference,
just as we would be inclined to grant such deference to T.D. 9511. We have
previously given deference to interpretive Treasury regulations issued with
notice-and-comment procedures, and the Supreme Court has stated that the
absence of notice-and-comment procedures is not dispositive to the finding of
Chevron deference.
Beard v. Comm’r, 633 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099,
182 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2012).
It is not clear whether proposed regulations are entitled to any deference whatsoever although
the Court has indicated that such regulations are not so entitled. Boeing Co. v. U.S., 537 U.S.
437, 453 n.13 (2003) (rejecting the taxpayer’s reliance on proposed regulations and stating,
“we find these proposed regulations to be of little consequence given that they were nothing
more than mere proposals”).
105. See Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era,
32 VA. TAX REV. 269, 275-78, 289-98 (2012) (setting forth the benefits of the Mayo decision
but cautioning that Mayo could lead to Treasury overreach). A recent study of the Circuit
Courts’ application of Chevron found that it is invoked less frequently in tax cases but, when
invoked, the Treasury’s win rate is relatively high. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker,
Article, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (Table 2,
manuscript at 49).
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B. The State Farm Doctrine
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a court may invalidate agency
actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.106 One year before Chevron, the Court decided the
seminal case concerning the Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard, Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.107 The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue practical and
objective motor vehicle safety standards and, in so doing, to consider all
relevant safety data, the reasonableness and practicality of proposed safety
standards, and whether such standards will contribute to carrying out the
purpose of the statute.108 The Department of Transportation issued several
standards between 1967 and 1978, first requiring automobile manufacturers
to install seatbelts and later requiring full passive front seat occupant restraint
systems, airbags or automatic seatbelts, in model year 1984 vehicles.109 In
1981, the Department ordered a one-year delay in the new standard, later
proposed a rescission of the standard, and eventually rescinded the
standard.110
106. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2010). Courts may also set aside agency action that is contrary
to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; taken without observance of required
procedure; a decision in certain hearings that are unsupported by substantial evidence; or
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial de novo. 5 U.S.C. §§
706(2)(B)-(F) (2010). Unless a statute provides otherwise, only final agency actions are
reviewable by a court. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2010). In general, a person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2010). However,
agency actions are not subject to judicial review if a statute precludes such review or the action
is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1)-(2) (2010). For a discussion
of actions committed to agency discretion and the non-delegation doctrine, see supra note 91
and accompanying text.
107. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983).
108. Id. at 33-34.
109. Id. at 34-37. Originally, passive restraints were required in all vehicles manufactured
after August 15, 1975. Id. at 25. In the two years preceding the effective date of the passive
restraint requirement, vehicles could be manufactured with passive restraint or shoulder belts
coupled with an ignition lock. Id. The shoulder belt/ignition lock option was selected by
most manufacturers but the unpopularity of this feature led Congress to amend the statute in
1974 to foreclose this option. Id. The effective date was later postponed for approximately
one year and then suspended pending the outcome of a demonstration project. Id. Finally, a
new Secretary of Transportation had the Department of Transportation issue the new standard
in 1978. Id. at 37. The standard was to be phased in first with large cars in model year 1982
and then to all cars by model year 1984. Id.
110. Id. at 38.
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The agency assumed that airbags would be installed in sixty percent of
new cars but the vehicle manufacturers planned to meet the standard in
approximately ninety-nine percent of new cars through the installation of
automatic seat belts.111 Because most automatic seat belts could be
disengaged with relative ease, the agency believed that the costs to comply
with the standard would be unreasonable in light of the minimal safety
benefits to be derived from its imposition.112 Moreover, the agency believed
that the public’s attitude toward vehicle safety would be soured by the
imposition of an expensive, yet ineffective, standard.113
State Farm and an automobile insurance trade group challenged the
rescission of the safety standard and the D.C. Circuit invalidated the
agency’s rescission because it believed that there was insufficient evidence
to support the agency’s conclusion regarding seat belt use, and because the
agency failed to give proper consideration to either a requirement to install
non-detachable seat belts or a requirement to install airbags.114 The Court
agreed with the D.C. Circuit that rescission of a regulation is reviewable
under the arbitrary and capricious standard but it held so in more sweeping
terms. 115 The Court stated that “the revocation of an extant regulation is
substantially different than a failure to act” and obligates an agency “to
supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required
when an agency does not act in the first instance.”116
According to the Court, the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow
and does not sanction the substitution of a court’s judgment for that of the
agency.117 An agency must articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
and there must be a rational nexus between the facts found and the agency’s
action.118 An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if the agency: (1) relied
111. Id.
112. Id. at 39.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 39-40. The court held that the rescission was reviewable under the arbitrary
and capricious standard and that such rescission was not analogous to a failure to issue
regulations. Id. The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes a court to compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2010). However, the courts
are much more reluctant to compel agency action than they are to invalidate actions once such
actions are taken, and will do so only if they find that the agency has a clear, nondiscretionary
duty to act. See Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 461, 465-66 (2008) (describing the
difference between judicial review of agency inaction and agency action, and explaining the
difficulty of obtaining judicial review of agency inaction). Agency inaction is often
considered committed to agency discretion by law or not considered final agency action, and
therefore, unreviewable. Id.
115. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 43.
118. Id. (citing Burlington Truck Lines v. U.S., 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
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on factors that Congress did not intend it to consider; (2) entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the issue in question; (3) offered an
explanation that is counterfactual; or (4) offered an explanation that is so
implausible that it belies a difference of opinion or agency expertise.119 An
agency’s reasoning, if opaque, may be discerned by a court,120 but, pursuant
to SEC v. Chenery Corp., the judiciary cannot provide a reasoned basis for
an agency’s action that the agency itself has not advanced.121 The Court held
that the rescission of the passive restraint requirement was arbitrary and
capricious because the ineffectiveness of detachable seat belts does not
provide a rational basis for rescinding the airbag requirement and, with
respect to automatic seatbelts, the agency failed to consider evidence
regarding the effect that detachable seat belts would have on vehicle
safety.122
1. Is State Farm Distinct from Chevron?
Several scholars and the American Bar Association have asserted that
Chevron and State Farm implicate similar inquiries and that the discernment
of a conceptual distinction between the two standards is difficult.123 Chevron
step two is unlikely to be met either by actions supported by counterfactual
or implausible justifications or by actions that fail to consider an important
aspect of the issue in question. However, despite their oft-stated similarity,
State Farm and Chevron are not the same. Chevron examines whether an
agency has reasonably interpreted the law,124 whereas State Farm seeks an
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
122. Id. at 48-49. The Court found that the Department of Transportation gave no
consideration to amending the standard to mandate airbags in light of its position that
detachable seat belts are not effective. Id. at 50. The agency’s assertions that airbags create
difficulties in the production of small cars and that public reaction to mandatory airbags would
be negative were, according to the Court, post hoc rationalizations. Id. Chenery mandates
that agency action, if it is to be sustained, be based on the reasons articulated by the agency
when it took action. Id. (first citing Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168; then citing SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196; and then citing Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981)). The Court acknowledged that agencies often operate in the face
of uncertainty and that judgments may be drawn from facts and probabilities. However, an
agency must do more than merely recite “substantial uncertainty” as its rationale for an action.
Id. at 51-52. Instead, it must rationally connect the facts found with the choice made and
justify why it is rescinding a rule before searching for further evidence. Id. The Court found
the Department of Transportation’s reliance on various data and its consideration of a
“continuous passive” seat belt option inadequate. Id. at 52-56.
123. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 162-64 (2010) (arguing
there is “little meaningful difference” between Chevron and State Farm).
124. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
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articulated, reasonable factual and/or policy basis for an agency’s action.125
Although both State Farm and Chevron will yield the same result in many,
if not most, cases, the tests are not identical. Chevron rests on notions of
agency expertise and congressional intent, but State Farm has other
justifications, including the imposition of discipline on agency decisions, the
legitimization of agency action, and the enablement of judicial review.126
Chevron step two permits any number of agency choices provided that
those choices are reasonable.127 In contrast, State Farm asks why the agency
made a particular choice. An agency’s choice may be permissible in the
abstract yet be inadequately justified. In State Farm, the Department of
Transportation had significant latitude to take action under the statute128 and
a variety of possible approaches—for example, passive seat belts only, air
bags only, seat belts for certain cars and air bags for others, or manual seat
belts with an interlock or buzzer feature—would probably have passed
muster under Chevron step two.129 State Farm however, required the agency
to articulate the reasoning to support the choice it made. In Mayo, medical
residents were subjected to payroll taxes by regulation because the Treasury
chose to address the status of medical residents on the basis of hours worked
and not on the primary purpose of the work performed.130 This choice is
neither arbitrary nor capricious in substance nor contrary to the statute, and
the Treasury articulated satisfactory reasons for its choice.131 Had the
Treasury failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision the regulation in
question would have been invalidated under State Farm but not under
Chevron. Chevron step two is, or should be, applied in the abstract. If
statutory language permits an action, then State Farm requires that a hard
look be taken at the reasons behind the action. This failure of Chevron step
two inevitably will result in a concomitant failure of the State Farm test.
Meanwhile, the opposite is not necessarily true.132
125. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42. Justice Breyer has noted that the law versus facts
distinction between the two tests is counterintuitive because of its implication that the courts
are more likely to defer to an agency’s interpretation of law than to an agency’s factual and
policy conclusions. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 765 (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of
Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 394 (1986)).
126. See Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power,
Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L. J. 1811, 1820-23 (2012) (laying out theories of reason
giving in the administrative context).
127. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
128. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 33-34.
129. Id.
130. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 49-50 (2011).
131. Id. at 59-60 (explaining that the Treasury Department justified its actions on the basis
of administrative efficiency and the policy underlying the Social Security Act).
132. Chevron and State Farm are most similar in circumstances that do not involve
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2. State Farm and Tax Regulations
The Supreme Court has never examined tax regulations under the State
Farm standard.133 Recently, State Farm has surfaced in two tax cases.134 In
one case, a court applied both Chevron and State Farm to invalidate a
Treasury regulation.135 In the other, a case with significant financial
ramifications for multinational enterprises, a court invalidated a Treasury
regulation under State Farm.136
a. Dominion Resources
I.R.C. section 263A sets forth rules for the capitalization of costs
attributable to real or personal property produced by a taxpayer and to real
or personal property acquired by a taxpayer for resale.137 Under the statute,
interest costs incurred during the production period and allocable to real
property and certain personal property with a long useful life are subject to

statutory interpretation. In such circumstances, the determination of whether an agency
action is permissible in the abstract cannot be ascertained without examining the factual
basis for the action. However, a statutory interpretation that requires no empirical data for
support, as was the case in Mayo, or a statutory interpretation for which no reasoned
explanation is put forth, as was the case in State Farm, may be permissible in the abstract.
For example, assume that a statute requires that compensation must be reasonable to be
deductible and that reasonableness is to be determined based on compensation paid for
comparable work in comparable circumstances. If the Treasury issued a regulation that
determined reasonableness based on some metric such as profit, revenue, or some other such
variable, then whether this regulation is a permissible interpretation of the statute depends
on whether the factual data supports that such a rule approximates comparable pay
standards. If not, it is not a permissible interpretation but this cannot be determined until a
hard look review of the Treasury’s reasoning takes place. In a deportation case, Justice
Kagan stated the Court would have reached the same conclusion whether it reviewed a
Board of Immigration Appeals’ action under Chevron step two or State Farm. Judulang v.
Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011). See Aaron Saiger, Agencies’ Obligation to Interpret the
Statute, 69 U. VA. L. REV. 1231, 1234-46 (2016) (arguing that an agency has an ethical
obligation to put forth the best interpretation of statute and not any interpretation that will
pass muster under a statute).
133. Two scholars recently examined all Supreme Court decisions between 1983 and 2014
that involved an arbitrary and capricious holding. See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin
Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1407-12 (2016) (listing all arbitrary and
capricious holdings). Their compilation included one tax case, Mayo. However, the Court
did not review the Treasury regulation at issue in that case under State Farm. See Mayo, 562
U.S. at 52 (applying only Chevron).
134. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Altera Corp.
v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015).
135. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
136. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015).
137. I.R.C. § 263A(a-b) (2012).
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capitalization.138 In addition to interest on any debt that is directly
attributable to production expenditures with respect to a property, interest on
any other debt is assigned to property under production to the extent that
such debt could have been reduced if the production expenditures had not
been incurred.139 Consequently, if production is financed by equity, internal
cash flow, or other non-debt sources of funds, then interest expense on any
debt can be capitalized under the theory that debt unrelated to production
could have been reduced but for the production expenditures. The Treasury
issued regulations that defined production expenditures, in the case of the
purchase of property for further production, to include the adjusted basis of
other property that is temporarily idled by the production, thus adding to the
total production expenditures and increasing the amount of interest that must
be capitalized. 140 Dominion Resources challenged the validity of the
regulation, and the Court of Federal Claims, applying Chevron, granted the
government’s motion for summary judgment.141 This decision was reversed
by the Federal Circuit Court because, according to the court, the regulation
in question failed both Chevron step two and the State Farm test.142
The court believed that the statute’s definition of production
expenditures did not speak directly to the issue at hand and, therefore,
Chevron step one was satisfied.143 However, the court held, for three reasons,
that the requirement to include the basis of idled property in the production
costs for which interest must be capitalized was not a reasonable
interpretation of the statute.144 The court further held that the regulation was
138. I.R.C. §§ 263A(f)(1), 263A(f)(4)(A) (2012). The interest capitalization rules also
apply to property whose estimated production period exceeds two years or whose estimated
production period exceeds one year and whose cost exceeds one million dollars. I.R.C. §§
263A(f)(1)(B)(ii-iii).
139. I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(1-2).
140. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B) (1994) (defining accumulated production
expenses for improvements to real property).
141. Dominion Res., Inc. v. U.S., 97 Fed. Cl. 239 (2011), rev’d, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2012). The court upheld the regulation despite its finding of several internal inconsistencies
within the regulations and its belief that the regulation’s interpretation of the statute stretched
the bounds of reasonableness. See id. at 257.
142. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’g,
97 Fed. Cl. 239 (2011).
143. Id. at 1317.
144. Id. at 1318. First, the court noted that no debt could have been reduced had
production expenditures not been incurred. The cost of the idled property cannot be an
avoided cost because such cost had already been incurred prior to production. Id. The
Treasury’s position makes sense only under the assumption that the idled facility could have
been sold and the sale proceeds used to pay down debt—an assumption that belies reality
because such a sale obviates the very reason for any improvement to the property. Id. at 131819. Second, the court held that the plain meaning of production expenditures is an amount
actually expended or spent. Id. at 1318. Moreover, the statute determined the amount of
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arbitrary and capricious under State Farm—the first appellate court to
invalidate a tax regulation—because the Treasury offered no rationale either
when it issued the Notice that provided guidance on the forthcoming
regulation or when it issued the regulation in proposed or final form.145
In concurrence, Judge Clevenger explicitly distinguished Chevron step
two from State Farm.146 He agreed that the regulation should be invalidated
under State Farm.147 However, he did not believe that the regulation should
have been invalidated under Chevron step two because the Treasury’s
position could be supported for several reasons.148 Judge Clevenger then
succinctly captured the distinction between Chevron and State Farm. The
application of Chevron “creates a binding rule (at least in this circuit) that
the government can never re-promulgate its associated-property rule for
property temporarily withdrawn from service, no matter how well-formed its
reasoning.”149 An agency can, in fact, advance a position that, in the abstract,
is a reasonable interpretation of a statute but that is insufficiently justified.

interest to be capitalized based on the amount of debt that could have been reduced had no
production expenditures been incurred. Id. at 1317. The basis of existing property is not an
amount that is incurred by a taxpayer. Id. This rationale is somewhat puzzling. If the statute
plainly foreclosed such a regulation, then Chevron step one was not met. If the meaning of
the terms “expended,” “spent,” and “incurred” are plain, then the statute does speak to the
precise issue at hand. Finally, the court concluded that the Treasury regulation could lead to
absurd results because the adjusted basis of idled property bears little relation to the cost of
improvements. Id. at 1318. Consequently, the same improvement could result in significantly
different amounts of interest capitalized. Id. Dominion’s two improvements were
comparable in cost yet the regulations required vastly different amounts of interest to be
capitalized solely because the adjusted basis of the two idled properties that were improved
differed by over $100 million. Id.
145. Id. at 1319. In Mannella v. Commissionerr, the court upheld the validity of a
Treasury regulation under Chevron. 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011). The dissent quoted from
State Farm, but the quote was used to support the argument that Chenery precluded the court
from considering the Treasury’s assertions in this case. Id. at 127 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
State Farm surfaced in a number of Tax Court cases over twenty years ago. See Patrick J.
Smith, Mannella, State Farm, and the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard, 131 TAX NOTES
387, 393 n.44 (2011) (listing citations of State Farm in the Tax Court).
146. Dominion Res., Inc., 681 F.3d at 1320 (Clevenger, J., concurring).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1321. See, e.g., id. at 1321-22 (explaining that the idling of a facility does result
in the incurrence of costs—lost revenue). Moreover, the regulation minimizes the opportunity
for tax evasion because the regulation prevents a taxpayer from temporarily placing such a
property in service to avoid interest capitalization. Id. at 1322.
149. Id. at 1322-23. See Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the
Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553 (discussing the
circumstances in which a court will or will not remand a matter to an agency for further
consideration); see also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 15051 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that in certain circumstances, remand without vacatur is
appropriate).
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b. Altera
The prevention of tax base erosion through the improper shifting of
income to foreign subsidiaries by U.S. corporations has been a long-standing
tax policy.150 I.R.C. section 482 attempts to determine the “true taxable
income” of a controlled taxpayer by putting such taxpayer in “tax parity with
an uncontrolled taxpayer.”151 This statute grants the I.R.S. broad authority
to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, and
allowances among controlled taxpayers as is necessary in order to prevent
tax evasion or to clearly reflect the income of such entities.152 Treasury
regulations have promulgated the “arm’s length” standard, under which the
terms of a transaction among controlled taxpayers must be similar to the
terms of comparable transactions among uncontrolled taxpayers.153 The
difficulty in determining comparable terms for transfers of intangible assets
led Congress to amend the statute in 1986 to require that the income with
respect to a transfer or license of intangible assets be commensurate with the
income attributable to the intangibles.154 This standard requires the retention
by the transferor of a “super royalty” that is subject to ex post adjustments
based on the income generated from the intangible in question.155 According
to the Treasury, the commensurate with income standard did not supplant,
but is consistent with, the arm’s length standard.156
The enactment of the commensurate with income standard was not
intended to prohibit the use of bona fide research and development cost-

150. See Charles Duhigg & David Kosieniewski, Inquiry Into Tech Giants’ Tax Strategies
Nears End, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.4, 2013, at B1; Charles Duhigg & David Kosieniewski, How
Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 2012, at A1 (discussing companies’
attempts to income shift).
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (2012); Comm’r v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 400
(1972). A controlled taxpayer is a taxpayer directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the
same interests. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(5) (2012). A controlled taxpayer also includes a
taxpayer that owns or controls other taxpayers. Id. For this purpose, control is broadly
defined. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(4) (2012) (defining controlled for the purposes of this
section).
152. I.R.C. § 482 (2012).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (2012).
154. I.R.C. § 482.
155. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Xilinx Revisited, 126 TAX NOTES 1621 (March 29, 2010);
H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 423-26 (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2) (2011) (describing
adjustments for transfers of intangible property). It is not clear whether the commensurate
with income standard is consistent with, or supersedes, the arm’s length standard. See
Deborah Brubaker Burns, Golden Apple of Discord: International Cost-Sharing
Arrangements, 15 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 55, 68 n.57-58 (2015) (discussing the IRS’s
comparison of the commensurate with income standard and the arm’s length standard).
156. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 7, 21 (1988).
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sharing arrangements.157 Compliance with the regulations allows taxpayers
to avoid messy factual disputes and the concomitant uncertainty of whether
these arrangements meet the arm’s length standard.158 The regulations
require that development costs be shared by the parties to a cost-sharing
arrangement in proportion to their share of reasonably anticipated benefits.159
To that end, they require that stock-based compensation costs directly
identified with, or reasonably allocable to, the development of intangible
property be included in the cost pool subject to the cost-sharing
arrangement.160
Altera Corporation, a Delaware corporation, challenged the
requirement to include equity-based compensation in the cost pool subject
to the cost sharing arrangement.161 Altera and its Cayman Island subsidiary
entered into a research and development cost-sharing agreement.162 Altera
compensated certain employees who performed research and development
157. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-481 (Vol. II), at II-637-38 (1986).
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (2013) (defining the arm’s length standard).
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (2013) (explaining methods to determine taxable income when
a cost-sharing agreement is in place).
160. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(3)(i-ii). The amount and timing of such costs are
determined under the rules that govern the deductibility of such costs. Treas. Reg. § 1.4827(d)(3)(iii)(A). However, a taxpayer may elect to determine the amount and timing of the
costs of stock options on publicly traded stock under generally accepted accounting
principles as reflected in the taxpayer’s audited financial statements. Treas. Reg. § 1.4827(d)(3)(iii)(B). Stock grants are taxable to the recipient and deductible by the employer at the time
the stock is transferable by the recipient or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever
occurs earlier. I.R.C. § 83(a) (2012). The amount of income recognized by the transferee from
such a transaction is the excess of the fair market value of the property received over the amount
paid by the recipient for such property. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1-2). Correspondingly, the transferor of the
property is entitled to a compensation deduction, at the time the recipient of the property recognizes
income, equal to the amount includible in the income of the recipient. I.R.C. § 83(h). If, however,
the stock is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, then the income recognition and the
corresponding deduction is postponed until such time that the risk of forfeiture lapses. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (1985) (describing procedures in case of the property being at a
substantial risk of forfeiture). However, the recipient of restricted property may elect to
accelerate the incidence of taxation to the time that the property is transferred and this
election also accelerates the employer’s compensation deduction. I.R.C. §§ 83(b); 83(h).
With respect to compensatory stock options, income recognition and the compensation
deduction are postponed until the date of exercise or disposition provided that, at the time the
option is granted, it has no readily ascertainable fair market value. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (1978).
Under generally accepted accounting principles, a grant of restricted shares is valued at the
date of grant and such amount is charged to expense over the vesting period. See generally
SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 123, §§ 16, 39 (Fin. Acct.
Standards Bd. revised 2004). This standard conformed U.S. accounting standards with
international accounting standards. See generally SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Int’l Accounting
Standards No. 2 (Int’l Acct. Standards Bd. 2004). Stock options are valued at the date of
grant pursuant to one or more option pricing models. Id., Appendix A at §§ A13-A37.
161. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015).
162. Id. at 93.
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activities in part with stock options and other forms of equity-based
compensation and the costs associated with this compensation were not
included in the cost pool.163 The I.R.S. allocated approximately $80 million
in income to Altera Corporation from its Cayman Island subsidiary as a
result of its addition of the equity-based compensation paid to research and
development personnel to the cost pool subject to the cost-sharing
arrangement between the companies.164
Accordingly to the court, the Treasury was required to provide an
empirical basis for its position and, therefore, State Farm supplied the
appropriate standard of review.165 The regulations failed to pass muster
under State Farm for four reasons.166 First, because the Treasury was unable
to produce any evidence that unrelated parties share equity compensation
costs, the regulations lacked any basis in fact.167 Second, the regulations’
application to all cost-sharing arrangements belied a rational connection with
the regulations and the facts found by the Treasury.168 The Treasury’s
assertion that no unrelated party transactions exist for cost-sharing
arrangements for the development of high-profit intangibles, if true, indicate
that the regulations should have distinguished between cost-sharing
arrangements for the development of such intangibles and those
arrangements for the development of other intangibles.169 Instead, all costsharing arrangements are subject to the same rules.170 Third, the court
believed that the Treasury’s response to the comments it received concerning
the regulations was inadequate.171 Finally, the court held that the regulations
163. Id.
164. Id. at 94.
165. Id. at 119.
166. Id. at 119-131. The Treasury argued that Chevron supplied the appropriate standard
of review in this case because the interpretation of I.R.C. section 482 requires no empirical
evidence. Id. at 123. The court, however, concluded that whether the regulation complied
with the arm’s length standard, which always require an analysis of comparable unrelated
party transactions, is an empirical question and is in no way dependent on statutory
interpretation. Accordingly, State Farm provides “the more apt analytic framework.” Id. at
119 (citing Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011)).
167. Id. at 121-22.
168. Id. at 113.
169. Id. at 125-26.
170. Id. Support for a uniform rule on the ground of administrative convenience was not
sufficient because the Treasury did not articulate this reason for the rule. Id. Moreover, even
if this rationale was articulated, the Treasury provided no facts to determine whether the rule
is justified by its purported administrative benefits. Id.
171. Id. at 126-30. Written comments were submitted to the Treasury and testimony given
at a public hearing by several prominent law and accounting firms, trade associations, and
academics regarding the regulation at issue. Id. at 104. The comments and testimony asserted
that no contracts between unrelated parties included equity-based compensation in the cost
pool subject to cost-sharing. Id. at 104-05. A survey of members of the American Electronics
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were contrary to the evidence because no evidence was presented to
contradict the evidence presented against the regulation, evidence whose
credibility was not challenged.172 The court dismissed the Treasury’s
admonition that the harmless error rule should be applied to save the
regulations.173
The Tax Court’s decision is puzzling for two reasons. First, the court
reviewed the Treasury regulation at issue against the arm’s length standard
as if that standard is set forth in a statute, but the standard is a creature of
Treasury regulations.174 The cost-sharing regulations interpret the
commensurate with income standard and its relationship to the arm’s length
standard.175 The Treasury was interpreting both the statute and its own
regulations. Consequently, whether the regulations permissibly construed
the commensurate with income standard should have been determined
under Chevron step two and whether the regulations were permissible in
light of the long-standing regulatory-based arm’s length standard should
have been determined under the standards of Auer v. Robbins.176 Because
Association and model contract provisions used in the petroleum industry provided further
support that such costs are not subject to cost-sharing between unrelated parties primarily
because such costs are speculative, uncertain, and outside the control of the compensating
party. Id. Also noted by commentators was the fact the federal procurement regulations
prohibit the inclusion of equity compensation in the cost pool subject to federal government
reimbursement. See id. at 106 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-6(i) (2013)). Two economists also
argued that compensatory stock options do not result in any cost to the grantor of the options.
Id.
172. Id. at 131.
173. Id. The harmless error rule is based on section 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act and allows a court to uphold an agency action if the agency’s mistake was not outcome
determinative. Id. at 131-32. The court was not persuaded by the Treasury’s assertions that
it had sufficient alternative reasons for its position and that subsequent developments in
financial reporting evidenced that its position is settled policy. Id. at 132-33. The Treasury
never indicated that it was prepared to rely on any reasons other than the arm’s length standard
as a basis for its adoption of the regulation and, due to treaty obligations, it was not clear that
the agency would have underpinned the rule on something other than the arm’s length
standard. Id. at 132. With respect to subsequent financial reporting development, the court
held that such developments were not relevant because the Treasury itself disavowed financial
reporting standards in promulgating the rule and, in any event, Chenery precludes reliance on
ex post developments. Id. at 133.
174. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1).
175. See Notice 88-123, supra note 156 (stating that the “commensurate with income”
standard is consistent with the “arm’s length” standard); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-481 (Vol.
II), at II-637-38 (1986) (indicating that bona-fide research arrangements are permissible under
the “commensurate with income” standard). See also supra notes 152-58 and accompanying
text.
176. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1991). Under Auer, an agency’s interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation is given controlling weight unless such interpretation is inconsistent
with the regulation or statute or is plainly erroneous. Id. at 461. Auer deference is not due to
an agency if its interpretation is not the result of “fair and considered judgment,” conflicts
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the legislative history of the commensurate with income standard stated
that cost-sharing arrangements were permissible if such arrangements
provided for a sharing of all costs, the inclusion of equity compensation
costs in the cost pool is, in my opinion, a reasonable interpretation of that
standard.177 Moreover, the inclusion of equity-based compensation in the
cost pool does not appear to be plainly inconsistent with the arm’s length
standard and, therefore, the regulation should pass muster under Auer. At
this point, under State Farm, the rule chosen by the Treasury must be
adequately justified.178
Second, and more problematically, the Tax Court failed to understand
the purpose of the cost-sharing regulations and, as a result, it required the
Treasury to produce evidence that is nonexistent. The cost-sharing
regulations, designed in response to the administrative burdens and
regulatory uncertainty imposed by I.R.C. section 482, are a safe harbor.179
Taxpayers have every right to ignore the cost-sharing regulations if they are
willing to risk noncompliance with the other rules set forth in the
regulations. In many respects, the arm’s length standard is a fiction
because it assumes that transactions between unrelated parties and
transactions among controlled group members share similar economic
attributes—a dubious assumption in a post-industrial economy in which the
creation and use of intangible assets is central to wealth creation. Because
intangible assets often are efficiently deployed only in the context of a
controlled group and require exclusivity to protect market share,
comparable transactions do not exist.180
with a prior interpretation, or represents a “convenient litigating position” or a “post-hoc
rationalization.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 170 (2012) (first
quoting Auer, 519 U.S.at 562; then quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
213 (1988); then quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462)). In a recent case, the Fourth Circuit held
that the Department of Education’s interpretation of its regulations under Title IX of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that required schools to treat transgender students consistent with their
gender identity was entitled to deference under Auer. See G.G. ex. rel. Grimm v. Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated sub nom., Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd. v.
G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239, (2017). But see Texas v. U.S., 201 F.Supp.3d 810, 832-34, 836 (N.D.
Tex. 2016) (granting preliminary injunction) (holding that Auer deference was inapplicable
to the Department’s interpretation).
177. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-481 (Vol. II), at II-637-38 (1986).
178. See Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 34 (1983) (holding that the agency must present an “adequate basis and explanation”
for a rule).
179. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b).
180. Controlled groups have collective assets—management, information systems,
sources of financing, institutional memory, brand equity, and culture, for example—that lead
such groups to enter into transactions that would not be offered to anyone outside the group.
Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing Regulations and the
Sourcing of Affilated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 642-47 (2007).
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State Farm requires that the Treasury provide a reasoned explanation
for the adoption of the rule in question.181 The preamble to the regulations
parroted the legislative history of the commensurate with income standard
when it explained that the cost-sharing rules attempt to clearly reflect income
among related parties when comparable unrelated party transactions do not
exist.182 The Treasury’s long battle against tax base erosion provided it with
the intuition that research and development arrangements among controlled
entities have no counterparts among unrelated parties. Agency intuition, as
noted by the Supreme Court, is entitled to deference in certain cases because
“there are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be
marshaled.”183
Whether one agrees with the application of State Farm in either case is
not relevant here. The salient point is that State Farm has surfaced, with
some ferocity, in tax cases. An open question is whether a State Farm
challenge can survive the Anti-Injunction Act.
III.

PFIZER-ALLERGAN MERGER AND THE ANTI-INVERSION
REGULATIONS
A. Background

The United States, unlike many countries, taxes its citizens and
residents on their worldwide income.184 Tax jurisdiction over foreign
taxpayers, however, is exercised under a source-based scheme.185 Foreign
nonresident alien individuals and corporations are subject to U.S. income tax
on their income from sources within the United States, and the tax scheme
varies considerably depending on whether the U.S. source income is

Moreover, the transactional approach of the arm’s length standard often fails to properly
source the parties’ allocable share of non-routine, or residual, profits. See Bret Well & Cym
Lowell, Tax Base Erosion: Reformation of Section 482’s Arm’s Length Standard, 15 FLA.
TAX REV. 737, 745-65 (2014) (discussing one-side and two-sided pricing methodologies and
the deficiencies in the former methodology).
181. State Farm, 371 U.S. at 168.
182. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 107-09 (2015).
183. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009).
184. Mechanisms to avoid double taxation include tax treaties and the foreign tax credit.
This credit allows U.S. citizens or residents to credit, within statutorily defined limits, foreign
taxes paid against their U.S. income tax liability. I.R.C. §§ 901-08 (2012).
185. For example, corporate inversion transactions have as their objective the replacement
of the U.S.-based parent of a corporate group with a foreign corporation based in a low tax
jurisdiction. These and other “earnings stripping” transactions have resulted in recent
legislative changes. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 108TH CONG., REP. ON EARNING STRIPPING,
TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter
TREASURY REP. ON EARNINGS STRIPPING].
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effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United
States. The net income connected with such trade or business is taxed at
graduated tax rates.186 Otherwise, absent a statutory exemption or contrary
treaty provision, a flat thirty percent tax is levied upon the gross income
generated from certain specified classes of U.S. source income.187
Consequently, a foreign corporation is not subject to U.S. tax if it
conducts no business in the United States and has no income that is sourced
in the United States. Subject to certain exceptions, a U.S. shareholder in a
foreign corporation is taxable on dividends that it received from the foreign
corporation.188 If the earnings of the foreign corporation are not repatriated
then no tax is due to the United States. The disparity in the tax schemes
applicable to U.S. and foreign corporations has led to various attempts by
U.S. taxpayers to engage in transactions to avoid U.S. taxation of worldwide
income including the use of intercompany debt and aggressive transfer
pricing for intercompany transactions to strip earnings from U.S.
corporations and shift such earnings to an affiliated foreign corporation.189
186. I.R.C. § 882(a) (2012). The performance of personal services within the United
States, subject to a minor exception, constitutes the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States. I.R.C. § 864(b) (2012). Trading in stock, securities, or commodities for the
taxpayer’s own account will not, unless the taxpayer is a dealer in such stock, securities, or
commodities, constitute a trade or business. I.R.C. §§ 864(b)(2)(A)(ii), 864(b)(2)(B)(ii)
(2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(c)(2) (1975). Direct ownership of property, with its
concomitant right to management and exposure to liability, is required for trade or business
status. Higgens v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941). Manufacturing activities, on the other
hand, invariably are trades or businesses. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(b), Ex. 1 (2005). Similarly,
the purchase and sale of goods will constitute a trade or business. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(b),
Ex. 2 (2005). The U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued the United States Model
Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006 (U.S. Model Treaty), whose provisions are a
starting point for negotiations with foreign nations. With respect to the taxation of business
profits, the U.S. Model Treaty provides that the profits earned by a foreign enterprise are not
taxable by the source country unless the enterprise carries on business through a permanent
establishment, defined as a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise
is wholly or partly carried on, situated in the source country. U.S. Model Treaty, art. 7(1)
(2006). Gain from the disposition of a U.S. real property interest is treated as income that is
effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business. I.R.C. § 897(a) (2012).
United States’ real property interests are broadly defined to include fee ownership interests,
co-ownership interests, leaseholds, options, and interests in certain corporations, partnerships,
trusts, and estates. I.R.C. §§ 897(c)(6)(A), 897(g) (2012).
187. I.R.C. § 881(a) (2012). The tax is generally withheld at the source. See I.R.C. §§
1441-42 (2012). Treaty provisions often provide for reduced rates of tax on such income. Id.
188. See I.R.C. §§ 951-965, 1293-1295 (2012) (stating that in certain circumstances
shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation must include certain amounts of taxable
income generated by the controlled foreign corporations prior to the repatriation of such
earnings).
189. See generally TREASURY REP. ON EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 185, at 11-23, 5561 (discussing, at length, the extent of tax base erosion through the use of intercompany debt
and aggressive transfer pricing).
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Corporate inversion transactions, which have occurred for some time,
result in the restructuring of a U.S. based multi-national group of
corporations so that the ultimate parent of the group is a foreign
corporation.190 As a result, the future profits of foreign subsidiaries are not
subject to U.S. tax because the shareholder of such subsidiaries is not
subject to U.S. tax. Moreover, inversions often are accompanied by other
maneuvers, such as the use of intercompany debt and the transfer of
intangibles to foreign members of the group, to reduce reportable profits
from U.S. operations.191
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 added section 7874 to the
Internal Revenue Code to mitigate the erosion of the U.S. tax base caused by
inversion transactions.192 This provision did not preclude the existing tax
treatment of such transactions. Instead, unless the foreign corporation has
substantial business activities in its country of incorporation relative to its
worldwide operations, the tax treatment of an inversion is based on the stake
that the shareholders of the domestic corporation retain in the post-inversion
foreign corporation. A detailed analysis of section 7874 is beyond the scope
of this work. In brief, if the shareholders of the domestic corporation own,
after the acquisition, at least eighty percent of the stock of the foreign
corporation by reason of their former ownership of the domestic corporation
then the foreign corporation will be treated as a domestic corporation for tax
purposes.193 If shareholders of the domestic corporation own, after the
acquisition, at least sixty, but less than eighty, percent of the stock of the
foreign corporation by reason of their former ownership of the domestic
corporation then the foreign corporation is considered a surrogate foreign
corporation and the income and gain that arises from transfers of assets by
the domestic entity and its U.S. affiliates for a ten year period are subject to

190. OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY 107TH CONG., CORPORATE
INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3-4 (May 2002), available at
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/millsteincenter/panel_1_001_office_to_tax_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE9D-UQRT]. The
methods by which such a result is effectuated vary. Id. at 4-6.
191. Id. at 6-7. There are other tax consequences that result from inversion transactions,
including the potential for immediate gain recognition as a result of transfers to foreign
entities. See generally I.R.C. § 367(a) (2012) (denying tax favored treatment for certain
transfers of property by a U.S. corporation by treating such corporation, for this purpose, as a
non-corporate taxpayer). A discussion of the immediate tax implications of these transactions
is beyond the scope of this work. Also, regulations were issued in October 2016 that restrict
the ability of U.S. corporations to strip earnings through the use of intercompany loans. Treas.
Reg. §§1.385-1–4 (2016).
192. American Job Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
193. I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2012). Stock of the foreign corporation sold in a public offering
related to the acquisition of the domestic corporation is disregarded. I.R.C. § 7874(c)(2)(B)
(2012).
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U.S. tax.194 If shareholders of the domestic corporation own, after the
acquisition, less than sixty percent of the stock of the foreign corporation by
reason of their former ownership of the domestic corporation then section
7874 is not applicable.195 Transfers of properties and liabilities are
disregarded if such transfers are part of a plan a principal purpose of which
is to avoid the purposes of the statute.196
The statute grants the Treasury the authority to issue regulations to
determine whether a corporation is a surrogate foreign corporation, including
rules related to the treatment of warrants, options, convertible securities, and
other equity-flavored instruments as stock and to treat stock as not stock.197
In addition, the Treasury is granted broad authority to issue regulations to
prevent avoidance of the statute.198 In 2009, the Treasury exercised its
authority when it issued a regulation that required that the ownership stake
of multiple domestic corporation shareholders be combined for the
determination of whether the statutory ownership thresholds are met if the
acquisition of such multiple domestic corporations were part of the same
plan.199 That same year, the I.R.S. announced, in Notice 2009-78, that stock
issued by the foreign corporation in an offering, whether a public offering or
otherwise, related to the acquisition of a domestic entity in exchange for cash
or liquid assets would be disregarded for purposes of determining whether
the statute’s ownership thresholds are met.200 Temporary regulations were
issued in 2014 that incorporated the guidance set forth in the Notice.201 In
2015 and 2017, further guidance was provided by the I.R.S. and the Treasury
that clarified certain rules, tightened others, and provided de minimis
exceptions to the application of previously issued rules.202
In April 2016, the Treasury issued temporary regulations that contained
rules discussed in the previously issued Notices.203 However, the new
regulations also contained a new multiple acquisition rule pursuant to which
any stock issued by a foreign corporation in prior acquisitions of domestic
corporations that occurred during the three year period before the execution
194. I.R.C. § 7874(a) (2012).
195. Id.
196. I.R.C. § 7874(c)(4).
197. I.R.C. § 7874(c)(6).
198. I.R.C. § 7874(g).
199. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-2(e) (2009).
200. I.R.S. Notice 2009-78, 2009-2 C.B. 452.
201. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-4T(i)(7) (2014). I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-2 C.B.
712, also indicated that such a rule was forthcoming.
202. I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775; Guidance for Determining Stock
Ownership; Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions, 82 Fed. Reg. 5388
(January 18, 2017).
203. Inversions and Related Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 20588 (April 8, 2016) (codified in
various sections of 26 C.F.R.).
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of the agreement of the acquisition in question, whether or not such previous
acquisitions were part of a plan to avoid the statute, is disregarded.204 Despite
the fact that affected parties had no opportunity to comment and the Treasury
failed to explicitly indicate a good cause for the need for immediacy, this
rule was effective immediately.205
In November of 2015, Pfizer Inc., the U.S. pharmaceutical corporation,
and Allergan plc, an Irish corporation, announced an inversion transaction,
a plan to merge into a new corporation that would be incorporated in
Ireland.206 Allergan plc itself was the product of several transactions
including a stock transaction with Actavis plc earlier in 2015.207 Actavis plc
was the product of a 2013 inversion transaction between Actavis, Inc., a U.S.
corporation, and Warner Chilcott, PLC, an Irish corporation, and a later
acquisition of Forest Laboratories, Inc., another U.S. corporation.208 Because
of the multi-step acquisition rule described above, the stock issued in the
Warner Chilcott and Forest Laboratories acquisitions would be disregarded.
Consequently, the Pfizer shareholders’ percentage ownership of the postmerger entity would exceed the eighty percent statutory threshold thereby
causing the post-merger entity to be taxed as a U.S. corporation. Pfizer and
Allergan subsequently scuttled the deal pursuant to an “adverse tax law
change” clause in their agreement.209 The Chamber of Commerce of the
United States and the Texas Association of Business have filed suit alleging
that the multi-step acquisition rule is arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act.210

204. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-8T (2016).
205. Inversions and Related Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 20588, 20904 (April 8, 2016).
206. Press Release, Allergan, Pfizer and Allergan to Combine (Nov. 23, 2015), available
at http://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/pfizer-and-allergan-to-combine
[https://perma.cc/ZY4Q-HQPX].
207. Press Release, Allergan, Actavis Completes Allergan Acquisition (March 17, 2015),
available at http://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/actavis-completesallergan-acquisition [https://perma.cc/H87V-B9VE].
208. Press Release, Allergan, Actavis Completes Warner Chilcott Acquisition (Oct. 1,
2013), available at http://www.allergan.com/investors/news/thomson-reuters/actaviscompletes-warner-chilcott-acquisition [https://perma.cc/VT9P-V6YK]; Press Release,
Allergan, Actavis Completes Forest Laboratories Acquisition (July 1, 2014), available at
http://www.allergan.com/investors/news/thomson-reuters/actavis-completes-forestlaboratories-acquisition [https://perma.cc/X4GU-4PNB].
209. Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer Announces Termination of Proposed Combination with
Allergan (April 6, 2016), available at http://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/pressrelease-detail/pfizer_announces_termination_of_proposed_combination_with_allergan
[https://perma.cc/YUP4-B5XT].
210. Complaint at 6, Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. I.R.S., No. 1:16-cv944 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2016).
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B. Application of the Anti-Injunction Act
By one estimate, Pfizer stood to avoid approximately $35 billion in
U.S. taxes because of the inversion transaction with Allergan.211 Therefore,
given the stakes, it would have been quite bold for the Pfizer’s board of
directors to authorize the consummation of the transaction and then
challenge the inevitable denial of the tax benefits by the I.R.S. in court.
Unfortunately for Pfizer, the Anti-Injunction Act requires such boldness.
Although a few judicially created exceptions to the application of the Act
exist, these exceptions are narrowly tailored and do not appear applicable
to Pfizer. Moreover, it is unlikely that the creation of a new exception for
rulemaking that is arbitrary and capricious under State Farm will have
much practical significance. The effect of the anti-inversion regulations on
affected taxpayers is unusual—perhaps not sui generis, but close to it.
These regulations have enormously deleterious tax consequences on
transactions that, once consummated, are virtually impossible to undo.
Consequently, the pay now, sue later paradigm imposed by the AntiInjunction Act is, for all practical purposes, a bar to taxpayer challenges.
The courts should examine whether the existing exceptions they created
should be tweaked to consider practical realities. Further impetus for such
an examination should come from Congress’s recent proclivity to use the
tax code for purposes other than revenue, a purpose the Anti-Injunction Act
singularly protects.
The Court has carved out several exceptions to the application of the
Anti-Injunction Act. It has held that proceedings whose success would have
the effect of increasing tax revenue are not barred by the Anti-Injunction
Act.212 The Court has also acknowledged two narrow common law

211. See Lynnley Browning, Pfizer Seen Avoiding $35 Billion in Tax Via Allergan
Merger, BLOOMBERG POLITICS, http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-0225/pfizer-seen-as-avoiding-35-billion-in-tax-via-allergan-merger [https://perma.cc/7JT7KBG5] (Feb. 25, 2016) (explaining that the inversion regulations were not the only tax blow
to the proposed merger). Proposed regulations were issued in April 2016 that were finalized
in October 2016 that would hinder Pfizer’s ability to strip U.S. earnings through the use of
intercompany debt). See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-1-4 (2016).
212. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 10302-03 (2015) (citing to two lower court decisions).
This case involved another statute, the Tax Injunction Act, which has been interpreted
similarly to the Anti-Injunction Act; see also E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d
1278, 1283-85 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that the statute does not apply when a suit seeks to
increase taxes), rev’d, Simon v. E, Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (holding that
the suit should have been dismissed for lack of standing under the Anti-Injunction Act). This
case involved a claim by several organizations promoting access to health care by the poor
alleging that an I.R.S. ruling that two hospitals were tax exempt violated I.R.C. section
501(c)(3). The plaintiffs asserted that the ruling violated the statute because it did not
condition the tax exemption closely enough to the hospitals’ charitable care for the indigent,
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exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. First, a pre-enforcement challenge
will be countenanced if the government could not prevail under any
circumstances and the taxpayer would suffer irreparable harm from
enforcement action. Mere allegations of unconstitutionality are insufficient
to trigger the application of this exception, as the Court noted in Bailey v.
George, the child labor tax case.213 Approximately a decade later, in Miller
v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida, the petitioner challenged an
excise tax that the government asserted was applicable to the sale of its
products.214 The Court found that the government’s assertion was erroneous
and, in light of previous court decisions, arbitrary and capricious.215
According to the Court:
[I]n cases where complainant shows that in addition to the
illegality of an exaction in the guise of a tax there exists some
special and extraordinary circumstances sufficient to bring the
case within some acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence, a
suit may be maintained to enjoin the collector. . . . It has never
held the rule to be absolute, but has repeatedly indicated that
extraordinary and exceptional circumstances render its provisions
inapplicable.216
The Court enjoined the enforcement of the excise tax because there
existed no legal possibility that the tax could have been validly assessed and
the payment of the tax would have had severe negative repercussions for the
taxpayer’s business.217
Thirty years later, the Court significantly narrowed the application of
this exception in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., a case
involving the application of payroll taxes.218 The Court held that whether a
challenged exaction would cause the ruination of the taxpayer’s business is
not, by itself, grounds for equitable relief from the application of the AntiInjunction Act.219 The Court acknowledged the exception set forth in
Standard Nut but stated that whether the government has any chance of
that its members were denied medical care, and that the I.R.S.’s action encouraged such denial
by the hospitals. Id. at 30-33. According to the Court, whether any encouragement caused
by the tax exemption resulted in the alleged denial of medical service was purely speculative
and it was plausible that the hospitals in question would forego the tax exemption and operate
unfettered by the restrictions imposed by such exemption. Id. at 42-44.
213. Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16, 19-20 (1922). See also Dodge v. Osborne, 240 U.S.
118, 121-122 (1915) (“[A] suit may not be brought to enjoin the assessment or collection of
a tax because of the alleged unconstitutionality of the statute imposing it.”)
214. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida, 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
215. Id. at 509-510.
216. Id. (citations omitted).
217. Id. at 510-11.
218. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
219. Id. at 6-7.
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prevailing on the merits is to be determined on the basis of information
available to the government at the time of suit and under the most liberal
view of the law and the facts.220 In a later case, the Court characterized
Williams Packing as the case that “switched the focus of the extraordinary
and exceptional circumstances test from a showing of the degree of harm to
the plaintiff absent an injunction to the requirement that it be established that
the Service’s action is plainly without a legal basis.”221 The Court has made
clear on several occasions that it is very difficult for taxpayers to show that
the government has no chance of prevailing on the merits.222 Most recently,
the Court held that a suit alleging that a tax on coal exports violated the
Export Clause of the Constitution was barred because, at the time the tax was
assessed, the scope of the Export Clause was unsettled.223
Under the second common law exception, a pre-enforcement action is
permitted if, under the circumstances, no other legal remedy is available. 224
In Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, the Court permitted
the University of Georgia and the Georgia School of Technology to
challenge the constitutionality of a federal admissions tax imposed upon
patrons of the schools’ football games for which the two schools were
responsible to collect and remit to the federal government.225 The schools
asserted that the admissions tax imposed an unconstitutional burden on an
essential state function.226 Because the tax was imposed on patrons, the
schools were unable to bring a suit for refund. The Court stated that the
statutory bar to tax challenges did not apply: “[I]n exceptional cases where
there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. This is such a case,
for here the assessment is not of a tax payable by respondent but of a penalty
for failure to collect it from another.”227
220. Id. at 7-8.
221. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 745 (1974).
222. See, e.g., id. at 737, 748-49 (stating that a determination of whether the government
could prevail must be decided under the most liberal view of law and facts in favor of the
government, and holding that the petitioner’s claims were sufficiently debatable to foreclose
the possibility that the government could not prevail); Alexander v. Ams. United Inc., 416
U.S. 752, 761-762 (1974).
223. United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 14 (2008). This case
involved the application of I.R.C. section 7422, a statute that precludes suits for refund if a
claim for refund was not filed. Id. The statute of limitations for filing refund claims had
expired and the taxpayer sought a refund under a non-tax statute whose statute of limitations
was considerably longer. Id. at 4-6. The Court believed that I.R.C. section 7422 was more
restrictive than the Anti-Injunction Act, but went on to examine the taxpayer’s argument that
Williams Packing did not bar its suit. Id. at 13-14.
224. Univ. Sys. of Ga., 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 448.
227. Id. at 449. A refund claim was sought by the respondents and denied because the
schools were mere collecting agents and had no interest in the funds collected if such funds
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In 1984, the Court granted South Carolina leave to file a complaint
against the Secretary of Treasury.228 The state sought to enjoin the Treasury
from enforcing a recently enacted provision in the Internal Revenue Code
that would deny a tax exemption to interest earned on the obligations of any
state unless the obligations were issued in registered form.229 South Carolina
asserted that the conditions imposed by the Internal Revenue Code provision
at issue destroyed the state’s freedom to issue debt obligations in a form of
her choosing and, thus, violated the Tenth Amendment.230 Moreover, the
state asserted that the federal government may not tax interest earned on state
obligations regardless of the form of such obligation.231 The state would be
required to pay higher interest rates on taxable obligations than it would on
tax exempt obligations. However, the state would be unable to challenge the
statute’s legality in a suit for refund because any taxes at issue would have
been imposed on the holders of the obligations.232
The Court believed there was no need for it to determine whether the
exception it set forth in Williams Packing was applicable because it held the
Anti-Injunction Act “was not intended to bar an action where, as here,
Congress has not provided the plaintiff with an alternative legal way to
challenge the validity of a tax.”233 Despite the dearth of legislative history
regarding the statute, the Court believed that the circumstances of its
enactment suggested that Congress did not intent for it to apply unless an
alternative legal avenue to contest the legality of a tax was available to an
aggrieved party.234 The Court proceeded to dismiss the government’s
argument that holders of the debt could challenge the legality of the provision
in question because of the uncertainty of whether such a challenge would, or
could, be mounted.235
The D.C. Circuit, in the Z Street case previously discussed, held that the

were, in fact, unlawfully collected. Id. at 446. The Court ruled in favor of the government
on the merits. See id. at 452-53 (reversing the Fifth Circuit’s decree in favor of plaintiff).
228. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 370 (1984).
229. Id. at 370-71.
230. Id. at 371-72.
231. Id. at 372.
232. Id. at 378-80.
233. Id. at 373.
234. Id. at 373-76. In the Court’s opinion, the amendment to the statute to include third
parties within its strictures was not relevant in this case. Id. at 376-77; I.R.C. § 7421(a)
(2012).
235. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. at 380-81. I.R.C. section 7478 permits a state to
seek a declaratory judgment from the Tax Court as to whether obligations a state desires to
issue meet the requirements for tax exemption. However, this provision does not permit an
action challenging the constitutionality of a provision or provisions that set forth the standards
for obligations to obtain tax exempt status. See id. at 378 n.17 (noting that IRC section 7478
does not provide a cause of action for contesting constitutionality as to section 103(j)(1)).
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Anti-Injunction Act did not apply to a non-profit organization’s claim that
the I.R.S. was delaying the processing of the organization’s application for
tax exempt status because of the organization’s political positions.236 The
court held that the action did not fall within the confines of the statute
because the suit was not brought for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax.237 However, the court also held that the AntiInjunction Act did not apply because its application would leave the
organization with no remedy.238 Section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code
does permit an organization to seek a declaratory judgment with respect to
its qualification as a tax exempt organization if the I.R.S. has not acted on its
application by a certain time.239 However, in this case, the organization was
not seeking to establish its qualification as a tax exempt organization but
rather to prevent the I.R.S, from unlawfully delaying its application.
According to the court, to require an organization to wait the requisite time
and then seek a declaratory action would free the I.R.S. to engage in
viewpoint discrimination in its processing of applications for tax exempt
status.240 If the organization’s action was barred, then it would have no legal
means to challenge the I.R.S.’s procedures for processing its application.241
Sebelius could have created another exception to the applicability of the
Ant-Injunction Act. The individual mandate at issue in that case did not
become effective until 2014, more than a year after the Court rendered its
decision.242 The I.R.S. was not yet enforcing the provision and, therefore,
challenges to the validity of the provision at the time the issue was litigated
did not impede the federal government’s assessment and collection of
revenue. Because the Court held that the mandate was not a tax for purposes
of the Anti-Injunction Act, it had no need to consider whether challenges to
a tax prior to its effective date are barred by the statute.243
The exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act set forth in Williams Packing
and Regan do not appear to apply to a pre-enforcement challenge to the
236. Z St. v. Koskinen, 791 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
237. Id. at 32.
238. Id. at 31-32.
239. I.R.C. § 7428 (2012).
240. Z St., 791 F.3d at 31-32. The organization could, in the event its application is denied,
challenge any tax deficiency asserted against it or sue for refund of any disputed taxes it paid.
Id. Similarly, the court held that these remedies offer no redress for unlawful processing of
applications. See id. at 31 (noting that remedies provided for in other provisions would do
nothing to offer relief as to the alleged delay in processing the Z Street’s application).
241. Id.
242. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b);
10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 244-49, 909-10 (2010) (codified as I.R.C. § 5000A (2012)
(mandating individuals to maintain certain amounts of health insurance coverage beginning
after 2013).
243. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 546 (2012).
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regulations that derailed the Pfizer-Allergan combination. As the Court
made clear in a later case, Williams Packing requires the taxpayer to show
that, with the facts and the law interpreted liberally in favor of the
government, the government could not prevail on the merits under any
circumstances.244 The anti-inversion regulations were issued pursuant to a
broad statutory grant of authority. Whether the regulations have gone too far
in light of the statute is not obvious and the Treasury’s position is, at the very
least, colorable. The regulations may very well be a permissible
interpretation of the statute under a deferential Chevron review. The statute
does not appear to preclude the Treasury from enacting a bright-line rule that
takes account of multiple acquisitions that occur within a certain time frame
for purposes of applying the statutory percentage thresholds. Such a rule
may very well be a reasonable use of the Treasury’s broad authority to issue
regulations to prevent avoidance of the statute.245 As previously noted, the
Court refused to grant a taxpayer relief to challenge an export tax that it knew
was unconstitutional because, at the time the tax was assessed, the
constitutional status of the tax was unsettled.246 Williams Packing is, indeed,
a high hurdle to overcome and the exception’s utility appears limited to
egregious regulatory overreach.
As previously discussed, the State Farm doctrine is separate and
distinct from Chevron and often its application does not go to the merits of
an agency’s action but to the agency’s adherence to procedural
requirements. For example, a regulation that may very well pass muster
under Chevron may not be supported by a reasoned explanation by the
agency. Alternatively, the agency may have failed to address comments in
opposition of the regulation. Arguably, an obvious failure to meet the
strictures of State Farm would render the regulation invalid under any
circumstances, whether those circumstances are viewed in a light most
favorable to the agency. However, even if one were to concede that
procedural defects render the agency’s action invalid on its face, it is
unlikely that a pre-enforcement would be countenanced and, if it were,
such a challenge would offer little practical utility.
If we assume that anti-inversion regulations were arbitrary and
capricious under the State Farm standard and that the agency could not
prevail, the exception set forth in Standard Nut still requires the taxpayer to
show an extraordinary degree of harm that results from the agency action.247
The Court in Williams Packing placed its focus on the merits of the
government’s position but it did not eliminate the second prong of Standard
244.
245.
246.
247.

Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737 (1974).
I.R.C. § 7874(g).
United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 14 (2008).
Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932).
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Nut, a showing of extraordinary harm.248 It is not clear whether the harm
must rise to the ruinous level that existed in Williams Packing, but it probably
has to be close to such level. It is unlikely that Pfizer could show such a
degree of harm to its business. Without question, the anti-inversion
regulations negatively altered the economics of the contemplated
transaction. However, had Pfizer consummated the transaction, it is not at
all clear that subsequent steps could not be taken to leave Pfizer in a tax
position not all that far from where it would have been had it acquired
Allergan in a more conventional acquisitive transaction. Moreover, it is
inconceivable that an enterprise of the size of Pfizer can encounter an
extraordinarily devastating blow from a tax regulation that diminishes the
profitability of its operations by subjecting it to taxes that it had been subject
to prior to the transaction in question.
In addition, a State Farm challenge that does not get to the merits of the
government’s position is, for practical purposes, of little utility. As the
concurrence noted in Dominion Resources, regulations that fail on
procedural grounds may very well have merit on substantive grounds.249
Procedural defects can be remedied by an agency and the rule in question
reissued. As previously noted, Treasury regulations may be issued with
retroactive effect in certain circumstances.250 Among those circumstances
are regulations issued to correct procedural defects in previously issued
regulations.251 A company in Pfizer’s position needs an answer on the merits
and, as noted above, whether the Treasury’s position has legal merit is not
obvious.
The exception to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act that the
Court applied in Allen and Regan is also unlikely to apply to a preenforcement challenge to the anti-inversion regulations. Both cases
involved a challenge to a tax that was imposed on third parties but whose
effect impacted the operations of the challengers.252 The two universities
and the State of South Carolina objecting to the tax provisions in question
were not the taxpayers and, therefore, could not pay now and sue later. As

248. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., Inc., 370 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1962).
249. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Clevenger, J., concurring).
250. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 7805(b)(1)(C), 7805(b)(2) (enabling tax regulations to have retroactive
effect in certain circumstances).
251. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(4) (“[T]he Secretary may provide that any regulation may apply
retroactively to correct a procedural defect in the issuance of any prior regulation.”)
Moreover, Treasury regulations can be effective on the date on which any notice substantially
describing the expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final regulation is issued to
the public. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(C) (2012).
252. Allen v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 304 U.S. 439 (1938); South Carolina v.
Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
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consequence, the Court held the Anti-Injunction Act inapplicable in
situations in which Congress provided no alternative means for a
challenge.253 Pfizer and other companies in a similar position do have an
alternative remedy available. Pfizer could have completed its transaction
with Allergan and then challenged the inevitable denial of tax benefits in a
suit for refund.
The anti-inversion regulations should cause the courts to consider
whether the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act should be expanded.
Specifically, the exception set forth in Allen and Regan should be
applicable if there is no practical alternative legal remedy to a preenforcement challenge available to taxpayers. The circumstances in which
such an expanded exception would apply would be rare but it would apply
in Pfizer’s case. Although Pfizer could have consummated its transaction
with Allergan and then litigated the validity of the regulations, as a
practical matter, Pfizer was left with no remedy. It is inconceivable that
Pfizer’s board of directors would approve the transaction in question on the
belief that the company would prevail in litigation against the Treasury.
The regulations in question are atypical from most tax regulations and, as
such, warrant a practical, nuanced, and more equitable view of the scope of
the Anti-Injunction Act.
The effects of the anti-inversion regulations are unique due to a
combination of attributes. First, the anti-inversion regulations apply to
transactions whose effects are, for all intents and purposes, long-lived.
Once done, extrication from their effects is difficult for the parties
involved. Second, such transactions are, by their nature, transformative in
nature with significant financial effects on the parties. As a result, a
taxpayer is unable to float a trial balloon as a test case to litigate the merits
of the regulations. Third, these transactions are voluntary. No one is
compelled, legally or practically, to undertake an inversion transaction.
Many tax rules share some, but not all, of these properties.
For example, a tax regulation often has significant financial
consequences on an ongoing operation. To that extent, the transactions it
impacts are not voluntary in the sense that the affected transactions will
take place with or without the rule in question. A post-assessment
challenge is an adequate response to government overreach in such
situations. Many tax regulations will pose barriers to one-off transactions
that are rendered uneconomical by the rules imposed by the regulations in
question. Tax rules may be issued that hinder transactions that are
contemplated as part of a family’s wealth management strategy, force the
restructuring of an asset acquisition, or alter the terms of a large lawsuit
253. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 304 U.S. at 449; Regan, 465 U.S. at 373.
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settlement, for example. However, in such cases, taxpayers who do not
want to abandon their plans can usually challenge the rules by
consummating a transaction on a small scale as a test case. Moreover, in
such cases, the tax effects are isolated to a particular transaction and the
decision to proceed notwithstanding the tax uncertainty may very well be a
reasonable decision.
In some measure, the inability to challenge the anti-inversion rules is
analogous to the cases in which not-for-profit entities, such as Bob Jones
University, were unable to challenge their denial of tax exempt status prior
to the assessment of tax. As a technical matter, such organizations had a
remedy—a post-assessment suit for refund. Practically, this remedy
offered little relief from the effects that the denial of tax exempt status had
on the ability of such organization to raise funds from donors who,
understandably, wanted assurance that their donations were tax
deductible.254 Congress acted to remedy this problem by allowing preassessment reviews with respect to an organization’s tax-exempt status.255
It is unlikely that Congress would enact legislation designed to encourage
inversions.
Ironically, the Court did not adhere to a rigid application of rules but
showed a willingness to examine the particular facts and circumstances in
the very case that it refused to apply the Anti-Injunction Act: Sebelius.256
The Court ruled against the government on two issues in that case.257 First,
it held that the individual health insurance mandate was beyond Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce.258 Second, it held that the expansion
of Medicaid under the statute impermissibly compelled the states to enact or
administer a federal program.259 The Court had long recognized that the
federal government may induce states, through the spending power, to enact
or administer programs.260 However, permissible financial inducements
become impermissible coercion when a state is left with no practical choice
but to comply—when “pressure turns into compulsion.”261 In this case, a
state that refused to expand its Medicaid program faced a loss of all federal
254. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 738 (1974).
255. I.R.C. § 7428 (2012). This exception was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and
has mitigated the hardship that the preclusion of a pre-enforcement remedy imposed upon tax
exempt organizations. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1306, 90 Stat. 1520,
1717 (1976).
256. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 587. The Court upheld the mandate under Congress’s taxing power. Id. at
570.
259. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 585.
260. Id. at 576.
261. Id. at 577 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 201 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Medicaid funding.262 In theory, a state had the option to refuse and lose a
great deal of federal funding. Practically, given the amount of money at
stake, a state had no choice.
Taxpayer standing rules prevent taxpayers from challenging
unwarranted government largess doled out as favors to specific industries
or as a means to achieve non-tax policy goals.263 The fact that the political
process can rectify agency overreach in such cases is of little comfort to
taxpayers who value fiscal responsibility or the rule of law.264 However,
the standing rules preclude a legal remedy for harms that are diffuse and
common to all taxpayers. At a visceral level, there is something more
sinister in the inability to challenge a rule that directly harms a particular
taxpayer. Agency action that forces a taxpayer to abandon a transaction
without the ability to challenge the merits of the agency’s action is an
invitation to agency overreach and usurps the separation of powers.
CONCLUSION
Over eighty years ago the Court opined that “taxes are the lifeblood of
government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious
need.”265 To that end, the courts have been reluctant to expand taxpayers’
ability to impede I.R.S. assessment and collection efforts. In light of the
increasing use of the tax code to accomplish objectives unrelated to
government funding, perhaps the courts should be less reticent to examine
the equities of a particular case when encountered by the Anti-Injunction
Act. The tax system has never served solely as a socially neutral revenue
machine, but Professor Kristin Hickman, in a recent study, has shown that
the tax system has been enlisted to serve policy goals unrelated to revenue
to an increasing degree in recent decades.266 Professor Hickman’s study
cast some doubt on the notion of tax exceptionalism as a reason for the
262. Id. at 581.
263. A taxpayer must show the sustainment of some direct injury and not merely some
indefinite injury she shares with people generally. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
(1923). The assertion of harm based on the effect of a tax policy on federal revenues or
expenditures is “too remote, fluctuating, and uncertain” and a taxpayer’s “interest in moneys
of the Treasury” is “shared with millions of others.” Id. at 487.
264. See Melone, supra note 78 (discussing Notice 2008-83 which provided favorable
treatment to banks to assist healthy banks acquire struggling banks during the 2008 financial
crisis and the resultant congressional response).
265. Bull v. U.S., 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935).
266. Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 Duke L. J. 1717
(2014). See also Linda Sugin, The Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court has
Reduced Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 777
(2013) (discussing how recent Court decisions have removed barriers to the use of the tax
code to achieve policy goals).
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Treasury excusing itself from the general strictures of administrative law.
The use of the tax code to serve social policy goals does not diminish the
government’s “imperious need” to raise revenue promptly. However, such
use of the tax system should cause the courts to question the inviolability of
the Anti-Injunction Act despite the equities of a particular case.
Admittedly, a multi-national corporation, particularly one seeking to move
its domicile out of the United States for tax purposes, does not make for the
most sympathetic party to argue the inequity of a statute. Nonetheless,
such a party is more sympathetic than a federal government agency whose
rulemaking is, for all practical purposes, beyond review.

